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Introduction
1 Background
In economic terms environment can be dened as a public good in its role as a provider
of amenities and a natural living space for the mankind. As a provider of inputs of
raw-materials and a receptor of wastes, environment is in most cases private good, al-
though it has been used in the past as a common property resource with a free access.
National environmental policy determines the quality of the public good and integrates
the concept of environmental scarcity into economic decisions, dening the institutional
framework for decentralized economic decisions that essentially determine the alloca-
tion of environmental resources. Since international trade constitutes a link between
countries and their respective institutional frameworks, the liberalization of interna-
tional trade has raised concerns that governments facing competitive pressures might
be reluctant to raise the environmental standards they apply to domestic producers,
and perhaps even lower these standards to enhance their competitiveness.
Tracing back to Pigou (1932), the consensus in the economic literature has been that
in a closed economy with perfect competition, a benevolent central planner maximizes
domestic welfare by designing the environmental standards to satisfy the usual rst-best
rule in environmental economics: the marginal costs of regulation equals the marginal
environmental damage generated by the environmentally harmful activity. The concern
about the link between trade and environment has induced a number of economists
to focus on the circumstances under which the optimal policy in a trading economy
should impose environmental standards laxer than this benchmark.
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The rst theoretical contributions to the trade and environment literature used per-
fectly competitive models of classical trade theory where the role of the environment is
an additional factor of production or production related externality. The benchmark
result in these models is that in a small open economy optimal environmental policy
coincides with Pigovian rst-best level. This can be understood intuitively in the fol-
lowing way: perfect competition in the export market does not constitute a market
distortion, because the domestic producerstake prices as given in the world market.
Since the market is undistorted, apart from the production related environmental ex-
ternality, a welfare maximizing market environment can be implemented through the
rst-best environmental policy.
If one considers the international markets with multiple distortions, it becomes less
clear that optimal policy entails Pigovian environmental standards. The reason is that
the policy decision is made in a second-best situation as the policy maker addresses
several distortions with just one policy instrument. Strategic environmental policy
approach is perceived as a favorable framework in formalizing the hypothesis that policy
makers might apply ine¢ ciently low environmental standards to implicitly subsidize
domestic rms with market power in the export markets. The key idea is that when a
government has an incentive to establish export taxes or subsidies to enhance domestic
competitiveness, but the access to these policy instruments is limited, the trade policy
incentives carry over to the design of environmental standards. As a result, the policy
outcome might exhibit ine¢ ciently low environmental standards giving the producers
an unfair competitive advantage and aggravating the environmental degradation, or
even worse, the countries may end in a race to the bottom, where not only trade
gains are lost, but furthermore, the environment is depleted.
Forest is a good example of a resource with several distinct economic functions and
values. It has a private value as an investment to forest owners, and it provides public
goods to the society in the form of amenities and biological diversity. Forest conserva-
tion requirements are designed to correct for the market failure that arises, when the
provision of the public good is neglected in forest ownersdecisions concerning the cap-
italization of the investment. In most wood producing countries, forest industries are
highly export oriented and the international market for forest products is dominated
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by relatively few wood producing countries. Therefore, the predictions of the strategic
trade theory are not implausible in the case of national forest conservation programs.
The rst two essays of this dissertation examine the international markets for wood
products and the domestic markets for timber inputs, and investigate the extent to
which features specic to these markets inuence the design of optimal forest conserva-
tion policies. By comparing the optimal policy outcomes with the rst-best benchmark
and the predictions derived in models of strategic environmental policy, the analyses
derive the potential sources of strategic distortions in forest conservation policy. In
particular, Essay I addresses the implications of competitive pressures in the design
of forest conservation policies, when the consumers exhibit positive willingness to pay
for products originating from sustainable sources. Essay II examines the implications
of timber importation on the forest conservation policy in an economy where wood-
processing industry buys timber from domestic forest owners and produces the nal
goods for the export-markets.
The third essay investigates the implications of national environmental policies on
imperfectly competitive international markets with information asymmetries. As op-
posed to the rst two essays, which examined mandatory environmental policy instru-
ments, Essay III considers the e¤ectiveness of voluntary policy instruments, namely,
environmental labels aimed to induce the producers to improve the environmental
quality of the products. The analysis formalizes the idea that credible environmen-
tal labeling is an important factor in correcting a market failure that emerges when
the consumers are willing to pay for productsenvironmental quality, but cannot ob-
serve the actual environmental condition surrounding the production process. This
mechanism is then employed to investigate the welfare consequences of the emergence
multiple national environmental labeling schemes in the international markets where
consumers cannot di¤erentiate between di¤erent labels and labeling standards.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. Next section
reviews the literature relevant to this thesis. The third section briey describes the
essays and summarizes the main results.
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2 An Overview of the Literature
Essays I and II employ strategic trade framework to examine optimal forest conser-
vation policies. The rst part of this section therefore reviews economic literature on
strategic trade and environmental policy with an attention on the relevant issues in
essays I and II. Essay III is based on vertical product-di¤erentiation framework with
asymmetric information. Hence, the second part surveys the literature on vertical
product-di¤erentiation, asymmetric information, environment and trade.
2.1 Strategic Trade and Environmental Policy
Strategic-trade framework has been widely used to formalize the reasons why govern-
ments might impose ine¢ ciently weak environmental standards.1 The literature traces
back to Spencer and Brander (1983); and Brander and Spencer (1985). These studies
analyze optimal trade and industrial policies, when the world market is imperfectly
competitive. Brander and Spencer (1985) developed a basic model involving two ex-
porting countries and one importing country. In each exporting country there is a single
rm that produces for a third country export-market. The game is in two stages. At
the rst stage, the government imposes an export tax, or - subsidy, and then rms
compete on the basis of Cournot competition.
Brander and Spencer showed that if the domestic country chooses the policy unilat-
erally, an export subsidy raises domestic welfare. The reason is that export subsidies
for domestic rm induce the rival rm to contract output. Hence, an appropriate sub-
sidy allows domestic rm to credibly establish a commitment to a higher output level,
replacing some of the foreign output in the export market. Among others, Barrett
(1994) and Conrad (1993) employed strategic-trade framework to illustrate how these
trade policy incentives carry over to the design of environmental policies. By a similar
line of reasoning these studies showed that policy makers are induced to impose weaker
standards than the rst-best so as to improve domestic competitiveness.
The strategic trade framework has attracted much attention among trade and en-
1Term ine¢ ciently weak regulation refers to policy decision that entails lower standards than
indicated by the usual rst-best rule in environmental economics: marginal social cost of regulation
is equal to marginal social benet induced by higher environmental quality.
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vironmental economists for it provides a convenient framework for analyzing the cir-
cumstances under which policy makers have an incentive to apply ine¢ ciently low
environmental standards for the reasons of competitiveness. A number of analysts
have elaborated the basic-model. In particular, rms potential to use investments
to alleviate the cost-e¤ects associated with environmental regulation has led analysts
to examine the so-called Porter-hypothesis (Porter 1991). Porter-hypothesis argues
that tight environmental regulation may spur innovation and thereby improve rms
competitiveness in the long-run. However, this argument has found little support in
rigorous economic studies. For instance, Simpson and Bradford (1996) examined the
Porter-hypothesis in strategic trade framework, and show that the argument holds only
under specic assumptions about rmscost function.
Essay I examines whether these basic results apply to forest conservation. The
model is similar to Simpson and Bradford (1996) and Ulph (1996a) in that the rms can
reduce their production costs through investments. The novelty is that cost associated
with environmental regulation is determined by a specic vertical-market structure
as the price of timber inputs is determined endogenously in national timber markets.
Furthermore, the conservation policy inuences the productspositioning in quality
space, because the consumers in the importing country exhibit positive willingness to
pay for nal-goods originating from sustainable sources.2
Several authors have addressed the theoretical and empirical weaknesses of the
strategic trade theory. Eaton and Grossman (1986) established that the result derived
by Brander and Spencer (1985) is reversed, if one presumed Bertrand conjectures in-
stead of Cournot. More specically, under price competition the optimal policy calls for
an export tax rather than subsidies. Tax makes credible the domestic rms promise not
to cut prices, and thereby relaxes the price competition and increases national income.
In the case of models of strategic environmental policy, the ndings are similar. For
instance, Barrett (1994) showed that under Bertrand competition, optimal policy en-
tails higher environmental standard than the rst-best. In a model with cost-reducing
investments Ulph (1996b) showed that policy result that obtains in Ulph (1996a) is
2A more detailed discussion about the literature on vertical product di¤erentiation and environ-
mental policy is in the next subsection.
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reversed under Bertrand-assumption.
Maggi (1996) re-examined the sensitivity of the results to assumptions about the
mode of competition, and considered a strategic trade policy model under endogenous
mode of competition. The model involves a two-stage game, in which rms rst choose
output capacities and then compete on the basis of capacity-constrained price com-
petition where the rms have the option to produce in excess of the predetermined
output capacity. In line with Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Maggi showed that the
mode of competition approaches to Cournot benchmark, when the cost of producing
in excess of the predetermined capacity level is high. However, when this cost is lower,
the capacity constraint becomes more exible. Consequently, the market equilibrium
coincides with that of pure Bertrand competition. The policy results provide a quali-
cation to the results in strategic trade theory by showing that a capacity subsidy is
weakly welfare-improving, regardless of the particularities of the market studied.
Essay II extends the literature on strategic environmental policy and forest con-
servation by considering the optimal conservation policy under endogenous mode of
competition. The model follows Maggi (1996) with the exception that the cost of ca-
pacity is endogenously determined in the domestic timber market that is modeled as a
bargaining process between the forest owners and the exporting rm. This framework
is then employed to analyze the impact of timber importation on the national timber
markets and the optimal design of forest conservation policies.
There are several empirical studies estimating the mark-ups of price over marginal
cost in international market. For instance, in case of the international market for for-
est products, Goldberg and Knetter (1999), and Yerger (1996) studied US exports of
linerboard paper and wood pulp, respectively. The studies provide evidence that ex-
port markets in several industries are imperfectly competitive. However, the empirical
evidence on the policy makersrent-shifting incentives is clearly lagging behind the the-
oretical developments. An exception is Hamilton and Stiegert (2002). Hamilton and
Stiegert employed real data and constructed a theory-based empirical test to examine
rent-shifting hypothesis in the case of a payment system associated with Canadian du-
rum wheat exports. The results did not reject the rent-shifting hypothesis, hence, the
authors argued that the established payment system was consistent with theoretical
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ndings.
2.2 Environmental Certication, Asymmetric Information and
Trade
When the victims of polluting rms can signal their environmental preferences to rms
through reduced demand for products, they can inuence rmsprotability and create
incentives for the rms to improve the environmental quality of the products. This is
the stylized fact driving the results in vertical product-di¤erentiation models applied
to production related environmental problems. For instance, Arora and Gangopad-
hyay (1995) and Cremer and Thisse (1999) have used a vertical product di¤erentiation
approach to provide an explanation for voluntary self-regulation. Consumers derive
utility from buying from a rm that uses a less pollution-intensive technology gen-
erating a price premium for goods with higher environmental quality. Di¤erences in
the consumersvaluation for goodsenvironmental attributes segment the market by
consumer types, and price competition between the rms induces a market outcome
that entails di¤erent environmental qualities.3
One of the underlying principles of vertical product-di¤erentiation framework is
that perfect information among market participants is critical for the e¢ cient oper-
ation of the markets. However, often the sellers are better informed about quality
attributes than the consumers, who may have misperceptions of the environmental
hazards associated with the use or the production of a certain product. The supply of
green products thus depends on the producersability to signal improvements in their
environmental performance to the consumers. Akerlof (1970) formalized the market
failure generated by the information problem associated with di¤erences between prod-
uct qualities. Akerlof showed that the markets are ine¤ective in providing quality and
only goods with the lowest quality survive the competition in the market. The reason
is an adverse selection problem: if the seller cannot signal the quality of the product
he is selling, the high quality goods do not get the desired price-premium, hence, only
the low-quality goods are o¤ered for sale.
3More recent literature involves Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003).
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Several analysts have examined the signaling problem in markets with asymmet-
ric information in a perfectly competitive and monopoly environment.4 However, the
literature on asymmetric information between buyers and sellers in a vertically di¤er-
entiated industry has deserved less attention. The exceptions are Fluet and Garella
(2002); and, Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) who used a duopoly model to exam-
ine how rms can signal qualities through prices and advertising. The results imply
that absent advertising, price-signaling is not a su¢ cient mechanism to implement a
separating equilibrium in terms of product qualities. The reason is that standard equi-
librium renements such as "intuitive criterion", to prune the set of pooling equilibria
(Cho and Kreps (1987)), are inapplicable in an oligopoly framework.
One suggested solution to the signaling problem in terms of products environmen-
tal characteristics is environmental labeling. Kirchho¤ (2000) examined a monopolists
incentives to invest in environmental quality in an asymmetric information framework
and showed that if the labeling requirements were randomly monitored by an indepen-
dent third-party, the monopolist nds it more protable to invest in quality. Cason
and Gangadharan (2002) studied the buyersperceptions of goodsenvironmental at-
tributes in a laboratory setting. The results establish that a certicate awarded by
a third-party labeling organization, induced a positive mark-up on the goodsprice,
whereas "cheap-talk" and reputation building were insu¢ cient mechanisms to generate
a high enough price premium.
These studies suggest that credible national labeling programs might constitute
an e¢ cient environmental policy instrument, especially in the presence of information
asymmetries between the producers and the consumers in the international markets.5
The intuition is that credible information about the condition surrounding the produc-
tion process will di¤erentiate the products from other products on the market helping
the domestic producers to capitalize on the price premium. The idea of government
4For instance, Milgrom Roberts (1986) and Schmalensee (1978) examined the quality provision
and rmspricing and advertising behavior under monopoly and perfect competition, respectively.
5Gabszewicz et al. (1981) examines the implications of international trade on quality distribution
on markets, showing that trade diminishes the number of product varieties o¤ered at the market,
but tougher price competition drives the goods with lowest quality out of the market. Motta (1992)
extends the analysis by allowing for sunk costs that the producers incur before production stage.
Motta (1992) establishes that the welfare implications of free trade depend crucially on the sunk cost.
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involvement in eco-labeling schemes under asymmetric information was put forward by
Rege (2000). Rege showed that in an asymmetric environment framework, a govern-
ment has an incentive to establish a penalty system, inducing the domestic producers
to produce under the environmental standards they claim to produce. This increases
the credibility of the domestic producers and thereby improves their competitiveness
in the international markets.6
Essay III considers the role of environmental labeling as a mechanism to mitigate
the problem of asymmetric information and the e¤ect of labeling requirements on the
international trade patterns in products that exhibit production-related environmen-
tal externalities. The essay extends the existing literature by introducing imperfect
competition, asymmetric information and signaling into a model of international trade
with vertically di¤erentiated industries. The analysis formalizes a welfare comparison
between two international labeling schemes: harmonization and mutual recognition of
labeling standards. Under mutual recognition of national eco-labels consumers cannot
observe the di¤erences between the existing labels. This generates an information-rent
in the export market inducing more producers to apply for the labeling program. Un-
der harmonization, the premium on the export market will be lost indicating lower
participation in the labeling programs. The welfare analysis compares these e¤ects
and describes the circumstances when mutual recognition of environmental labels is
welfare superior to harmonization.
6Moeltner and van Kooten (2003) test empirically the argument that European buyers exhibit
greater concern for forest management practices, and hence, rms that serve mostly European markets
are more eager to certify their products. The results indicate that consumer preferences in the export
market constitute an important factor explaining why rms seek to apply for a label. Furthermore, the
results support the argument that producing countries may benet from export-driven certication
through improvement in domestic environmental quality.
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3 Contents of the Dissertation
3.1 Essay I:
Optimal Forest Conservation: The Role of Green-Image
Demand and Investments
Essay I considers three relevant factors in forest industry that might inuence the design
of the socioeconomically optimal forest conservation policy. First, raising conservation
requirements the government applies to domestic forest owners increases timber prices.
Higher timber prices, in turn, increase the production costs and thereby diminish the
competitiveness of the forest industry. Second, the forest industry can use investments
to reduce the cost of using timber in production, indicating that the industry might have
an incentive to increase the level of investments to alleviate the negative cost e¤ect in
terms of higher timber prices. Finally, if raising conservation requirements increases the
consumerswillingness to pay for products originating from sustainable sources, higher
requirements can improve the competitiveness of the industry through the green-image
e¤ect which di¤erentiates its product from other products on the market. The analysis
solves for an optimal conservation level when governments recognize how these e¤ects
inuence the competitiveness of the domestic industry. The optimal solution is then
compared with the rst-best outcome to identify the potential distortions generated by
the strategic behavior on the behalf of the governments.
The model builds on Simpson and Bradford (1996), Ulph (1996a) and Ulph (1996b),
except that the governments intervention a¤ects the productspositioning in quality
space. The results demonstrate that raising conservation requirements reduces domes-
tic industrys competitiveness through reductions in investments and higher timber
price. However, when the demand e¤ect generated by the productsgreen-image is
high, tighter conservation level improves domestic competitiveness. Optimal conserva-
tion level is thus higher than the rst-best, because it gives the government an incentive
to increase the consumerswillingness to pay for domestic products by raising the con-
servation requirements.
The results also establish that the equilibrium might not exhibit the usual Pris-
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oners Dilemma outcome in strategic trade models.7 The reason is that a raise in
conservation requirements in both exporting countries increases both production costs
and consumerswillingness to pay. The demand e¤ect gives the governments an ex-
ante incentive to impose higher conservation requirements. When both governments
have the same conjecture, the unintended consequence of the policy game is that the
product di¤erentiation e¤ect is weaker than anticipated. It then follows that the cost
e¤ects are more likely to dominate the demand e¤ects, indicating an increase in prices
and prots of both industries, because the aggregate output supplied to the export
market decreases.
3.2 Essay II:
Optimal Forest Conservation Under Endogenous Mode of
Competition: The Role of Timber Imports
Essay II is an investigation into a forest sector where rms producing processed wood
products for export markets can either buy domestic timber from the domestic forest
owners or acquire timber inputs from the world markets. Within this framework the
study examines the implications of timber importation on the international markets for
processed wood products and on the national timber markets. Furthermore, the model
will be employed to address the question whether the potential to use imported timber
provides new opportunities for forest conservation in wood-producing countries?
The model considers the domestic timber market as a bargaining process where the
exporting rm bargains with domestic forest owners over timber prices. The rm then
competes on the export market on the basis of capacity-constrained price competition.
Following Maggi (1996), the key feature of the game is that the rms can mitigate the
price competition on the market for nal goods through a precommitment to a certain
output level determined by timber inputs acquired from domestic timber market. This
capacity level has its full commitment value when the unit cost of timber importation
is above a critical level for which the combined production costs become high enough
7That is, when both governments engage in strategic design of environmental policies, the equilib-
rium of the policy game involves ine¢ ciently low environmental standards and negative trade gains.
See e.g. Barrett (1994) and Spencer and Barret (1983).
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so that the rm will be priced out of the market. In this case, the outcome of the game
coincides with the Cournot benchmark. The lower the unit cost of timber imports, the
closer the price to the more competitive Bertrand benchmark.
The analysis contributes to the existing literature on strategic environmental policy
and forest economics in the following way. First, a lower cost of timber importation
leads to more competitive pricing on the export-market and in domestic timber market
reducing the aggregate prot in the forest sector. Second, the results entail a qualica-
tion to the usual results in strategic environmental policy models in the sense that the
optimal policy is less sensitive to assumptions about the mode of competition, because
the option to use timber imports makes the export market less sensitive to asymmetric
changes in domestic timber prices.
3.3 Essay III:
Harmonization Versus Mutual Recognition of National
Eco-labels
A national eco-labeling program is an e¢ cient instrument to certify that certain pro-
ducers comply with a set of particular environmental standards guaranteeing sustain-
able conditions surrounding the production process. A market-based reason for the
existence of eco-labels is their role as a signal of higher environmental quality, when
the consumers with willingness to pay for this information cannot fully assess whether
producers actually produce at the standards they claim to produce. In international
markets, eco-labels have become an important factor in the market access, generating
pressures for the producers to apply for a label. Some national eco-labeling schemes
are thus often considered either discriminating against producers with di¤erent label-
ing requirements or imposing too lax standards that might not coincide with the social
priorities of other countries. These arguments have fueled public debate about appro-
priate level of di¤erentiation between region-specic labeling standards in the global
markets.
There are two suggested remedies for the problem of multiple country-specic la-
bels. Harmonizing labeling standards means that the exporters can sell their products
12
without having to comply with di¤erent regulations in each country and ensures the
consumers that imported products comply with the same standards. A fundamental
problem inherent to harmonization is that di¤erent regions have di¤erent environmental
and social priorities, indicating that harmonized standards are not always appropriate
for the environmental or economic conditions in exporting countries. Furthermore,
under harmonized labeling standards the price-cost mark-up generated by the labels
might be insu¢ cient for some producers to participate the labeling schemes.
The second remedy is mutual recognition of existing labeling schemes. This means
that if a product is eligible for a label granted by a national labeling program, it would
automatically receive an equal treatment with any other label in the importing coun-
tries. Mutual recognition arguably allows for more leverage to consider the national
characteristics in the design of labeling standards, and therefore, it should induce higher
participation in the labeling programs. The adverse e¤ect of mutual recognition is that
when consumers cannot observe the actual di¤erences between the product qualities,
goods with higher labeling standards may not survive the competition.
Essay III examines the role of asymmetric information in the producersendoge-
nous quality decision in a closed economy and provides a welfare comparison between
the regimes of mutual recognition and harmonization of eco-labels in international
trade. In particular, the aim of the study is not to examine the design optimal la-
beling programs. Instead, it formalizes the market-based reasons for the emergence
of eco-labeling programs and illustrates the market failures generated by the mutual
recognition and harmonization of eco-labels in international markets. By comparing
the welfare implications of these market failures, the study might be of help in under-
standing the trade-o¤s associated with the international coordination of eco-labeling
programs.
The study extends the existing literature on quality signaling and environmental
quality di¤erentiation in the following respects. First, the model illustrates the im-
plications of asymmetric information and signaling on the rmsendogenous quality
decision. Second, it formalizes the reasoning and the welfare implications of third-
party eco-labeling schemes in a vertically di¤erentiated oligopoly under asymmetric
information. Finally, unlike Jansen and Lincé de Faria (2002) the study considers the
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welfare implications of harmonization and mutual recognition, when the producers can
use price signaling to inuence consumersbeliefs about the labeling requirements in
di¤erent countries.
The main contributions of the last essay are as follows. First, although the existing
qualities and the associated costs are common knowledge, the market for goods with
high environmental quality collapses, because the rms cannot implement equilibrium
in which the consumers observe the quality di¤erences between the rms. Second, a
third-party eco-labeling program can be used to implement equilibrium with di¤erent
environmental qualities, but the market outcome fails to satisfy the criteria for Pareto
e¢ ciency. Finally, if the producing countries are opened for trade, mutual recognition
of country-specic eco-labels Pareto dominates harmonization of labeling standards,
provided that the di¤erence between the labeling standards is low.
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Essay I: Optimal Forest Conservation: The Role of
Green-Image Demand and Investments
Abstract
This paper investigates optimal forest conservation in a strategic-trade frame-
work. Exporting rms produce processed wood products with domestic timber
supplied by forest owners, and use investments to reduce their production costs.
Conservation inuences the industry-equilibrium through higher timber prices
and a price-premium generated by customerswillingness to pay for the prod-
uctsgreen-image. The results demonstrate that tight conservation requirement
increases timber prices, inducing a reduction in the rms investments and out-
put. A strong demand-e¤ect reverses the result as the price premium leads to
an expansion in domestic output. Finally, the optimal conservation level is lower
than the Pigouvian one, unless the demand-e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong. Under
a strong demand e¤ect, the equilibrium of a multilateral policy-game involves
higher industry prot and higher conservation requirements in both producing
countries.
Keywords: forest conservation, investments, timber market, wood-product
exports, product-di¤erentiation
JEL Classication: F12, Q28, L15
1 Introduction
Most wood-producing countries are modifying their forest policies to reect interna-
tional concerns with environmental damages associated with commercial forestry. In-
cluded among these are e¤orts to reduce logging on ecologically valuable natural habi-
tats and change forestry practices to sustain not only timber yields, but also other
forest outputs such as biodiversity. In countries where forests are privately owned the
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forest sector is, however, concerned that mandatory conservation requirement might
reduce forest ownerswelfare and the competitiveness of domestic industry. These con-
cerns have raised a policy debate as some argue that the competitive pressures might
diminish governmentsincentives to raise conservation requirements they apply to the
forest owners. The present study might be of use in formalizing these arguments and
in describing the factors in international forest industry a¤ecting the socioeconomically
optimal design of conservation policies.
In the recent decades economists have examined the trade-o¤ between environmen-
tal policy and competitiveness. In particular, several authors have adopted a strategic
trade approach which provides a useful framework in examining the idea that environ-
mental policies can be used as an indirect trade policy instrument to improve domestic
competitiveness. Conrad (1993) and Barrett (1994) were the rst to follow the lead
of the model of imperfect competition on a third-country export market put forward
by Brander and Spencer (1985). These studies demonstrate that when an increase
in environmental standards a¤ect the industry equilibrium in an imperfectly compet-
itive export market, the optimal policy-design entails a distortion from the rst-best,
Pigovian level.
The intuition is that governments have diminished incentives to fully internalize
the domestic environmental damages as lower standards can be used to shift rents
from the export market. These analysis, however, neglect the idea that in response to
environmental regulation the targeted industry might have an incentive to invest in a
cost-reducing R&D to alleviate the cost e¤ects associated with environmental regula-
tion. This presumption and its implications to the optimal design of environmental
policy were rst introduced by Porter (1991). The so-called Porter-hypothesis assumes
that tight regulatory framework may spur innovation investments in novel technolo-
gies and thereby improve the domestic competitiveness in the long-run. This, in turn,
implies that an optimal environmental policy calls for tighter environmental standards
to promote domestic competitiveness. The Porter-hypothesis has been addressed by
several economists. For instance, Simpson and Bradford (1996) examine the so-called
Porter-hypothesis in a strategic trade framework which arguably constitutes a plausible
environment for the analysis. The results, however, indicate that the hypothesis holds
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only in limited circumstances.1
Trade and environmental policy has deserved considerable attention in economic lit-
erature, but relatively few authors have examined the link between competitiveness of
the forest sector and forest conservation policy. An exception is Koskela and Ollikainen
(2001) which develops a model analyzing the welfare implications of mandatory forest
conservation in an economy with private forest owners and domestic industry which
competes with an outside industry in domestic markets for processed wood products.
The authors suggest that the optimal forest conservation policy depends on the fol-
lowing factors. First, conservation requirements tend to decrease the welfare of forest
owners, and consequently, impose upward pressure on timber prices. Second, the in-
crease in timber price reduces the competitiveness and hence the market share of the
domestic industry through higher production costs. Finally, reecting a recent trend in
international markets for wood products, the study establishes that when consumers
exhibit willingness to pay for products environmental attributes, a positive green-
imagedemand e¤ect may well o¤set the negative welfare e¤ects associated with the
loss of competitiveness on the supply side.
While the arguments put forward by Koskela and Ollikainen (2001) are intuitively
clear, they do not analyze the potential policy-distortions generated by the imperfect
competition in the downstream market for the nal goods or the consumerspreferences
toward goods originating from sustainable sources. Hence, there are compelling reasons
to reconsider the design for optimal forest conservation policy in an open economy.
The rst reason is that no one has yet studied forest conservation policies in a strategic
trade framework to illustrate the governmentsrent-shifting incentives. Another reason
is that the cost of wood-extraction and processing has decreased over the past decades
due to increased investments in cost-saving technologies.2 This suggests that to gain
1In a similar framework, Ulph (1996a) establishes that tighter environmental regulation induces
rms to do more cost reducing R&D, but this e¤ect is not enough to prevent governments from
imposing ine¢ ciently low environmental requirements.
2Stier and Bengston (1992) review empirical literature on technical change to forest industry in U.S.
and summarize the results. The results suggest that technological change in forest wood processing
industry is capital-using and labor-saving. Sedjo (1997) discusses the recent developments in logging
technology and reports that technological change has also been capital-using. Sedjo (1997) also reports
mostly anecdotal evidence that the development has been driven, among other things, by tighter
environmental requirements on forest management practices.
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broader understanding on the issue we should also consider the industriesincentives
to use investments to alleviate the cost e¤ects of higher timber prices. Finally, in
the literature on strategic environmental policy, the results are driven by supply-side
e¤ects of environmental regulation which reect the producersstrategic responses to
changes in the rivals cost structure. All these analyses, however, reject the potential
demand-side e¤ects which can be a signicant factor in the design of environmental
policies, especially in the forest industry where the international market involves several
international forest certication programs.3
Extending Koskela and Ollikainen (2001), the present paper considers how the
trade-o¤ between the competitiveness of forest sector and the social benets generated
by non-timber output of forests a¤ects the design for optimal forest conservation pol-
icy. The analysis builds on Spencer and Brander (1983), and Ulph (1996a) with the
exception that it captures the following features specic to the forest industry. The
rst feature is that the public intervention into the markets involves a mandatory forest
conservation requirement which imposes a cost on the targeted industry that is real-
ized through domestic timber markets.4 The second feature is that the conservation
requirements a¤ect the consumersperception of the productspositioning in quality-
space as there is a green-imagee¤ect increasing the consumerswillingness to pay for
goods originating from a country where the logging practices have been modied to
reduce the area eligible for harvest and leave more standing trees on harvested areas.5
The analysis demonstrates the usual trade-o¤ in the design of environmental policy
as the forest conservation a¤ects domestic income by reducing the industrys compet-
itiveness through reductions in investments and higher timber prices. However, the
analysis formalizes the intuitive result that a green-image e¤ect can improve the rms
3The emergence of various industry-led forest certication programs indicates that the green image
e¤ect might be an important factor in the design of conservation policies. For instance, Ozanne and
Vlosky (1997) report that 63 percent of consumer would be willing to pay more for wood-products
originating from sustainable sources, and Ozanne and Smith (1998) identify market segment for cer-
tied wood products. Murray and Abt (2001) show that the required price-compensation that would
induce forest owners to adopt sustainable management practices is relatively small. Furthermore,
Moeltner and van Kooten (2003) establish that producing for the export market is an important
factor explaining why producers improve their forest management practices.
4This is in line with Linden and Uusivuori (2002) who establish forest conservation policies increase
timber prices on the market where forests are privately owned.
5For example, the new forest law in Finland which came into e¤ect 1997 imposes such limitations
on the commercial harvesting of timber in privately and publicly owned forests.
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competitiveness through a green-image e¤ect realized on the demand side of the mar-
ket. Optimal conservation policy thus depends on the relative magnitude of the cost
and demand e¤ects and entails a conservation level which is lower than the rst-best,
unless the demand e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong.
The nature of the optimal forest conservation policies indicates that the usual Pris-
oners Dilemma outcome in strategic trade models with non-cooperative policy decisions
emerges as equilibrium under limited circumstances, when the green-image demand is
strong enough.6 A symmetric raise in forest conservation requirements in the export-
ing countries increases both production costs and consumerswillingness to pay for any
wood-product on the market. Hence, the degree of product di¤erentiation is less than
the governments had anticipated. The immediate consequence is that the cost e¤ect of
conservation is more likely to dominate the green-image demand e¤ect, indicating an
increase in prices and prots of both industries due to a contraction in the aggregate
supply on the export market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section describes
the rmsproduction technology and the demand system representing customerspref-
erences in the presence of green-image demand. Section 3 describes the rmsbehavior
in the export market and domestic timber market. Section 4 investigates the impact on
conservation policy on the equilibrium outcomes on the export market. Finally, section
5 analyses the optimal conservation policy, and the bilateral policy game between the
governments. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries: Production Costs and Green-image
Demand
The model is a game in threes stages involving two exporting countries and a third
importing country. In each exporting country there is a rm producing processed wood
6The Prisoners Dilemma outcome emerges in strategic trade models, because each government
has an incentive to relax the environmental policies for the reasons of competitiveness. Hence, the
welfare in both countries is reduced as the aggregate output on the export market increases and lower
environmental requirements exacerbate the production-related environmental externalities. See e.g.
Barrett (1994).
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products for a third-country export market.7 At stage one, the rms invest in cost-
reducing technology, which reduces the unit cost of using timber in production. At the
second stage, the rms buy timber from domestic forest owners and, nally, compete
on the basis a Cournot competition in a third-country export market. Prior the game
played by the rms, the governments of the exporting countries choose the conservation
requirements they apply to domestic forest owners. We consider both unilateral policy
decision and non-cooperative policy game. A unilateral policy decision involves one
government choosing the conservation level and the non-cooperative policy game refers
to a simultaneous policy choice in both producing countries.
The producing countries are denoted by i and j, and superscripts are used to
indicate country specic variables. Firm i produces nal products, qi, with domestic
timber inputs, xi. To save on notation, we consider a linear production technology in
terms of timber inputs and normalize the input coe¢ cient to unity. Letting ti denote
the timber price, the cost function can be formulated as
Ci(ki; ti; qi) = [ti + ci(ki)]qi;
where ci(ki) is a unit cost function describing the production costs net of timber price.
We assume that the unit cost function is decreasing in investments:
Ciki(k
i; ti; qi) < 0
The cost-reducing e¤ect, however, declines as the level of investments increases, i.e.
Cikiki(k
i; ti; qi) > 0.
In modeling the green-image demand we adopt a formulation widely used in the
industrial organization literature on vertical product di¤erentiation.8 Consumer ns
utility of consuming one unit of product qi is denoted by the following indirect utility
7The assumption that there is only one rm in each country arguably simplies the analysis, but it
is not implausible as the rm can rather be interpreted as a representative rm of the forest industry
in each country. The implications of this assumption on the structure of the domestic timber market
will be discussed below.
8The terminology "green-image" is borrowed from Koskela and Ollikainen (2001).
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function9
U(hi; pi) = (hi)n   pi;
where pi denotes the price of product qi and (hi) is a parameter reecting the con-
sumersperception on the impact of mandatory harvesting constraints on the ecological
conditions in the forests of country i. This parameter is uniform to each consumer and
an increasing function of the mandatory conservation requirement, hi, in country i.
Letting hi0 < h
i denote the laissez faire conservation level, the quality factor satises
the following properties: (hi0) = 1; 
0(hi) > 0 and 00(hi) < 0.10 In line with the
literature on vertical product di¤erentiation we assume that consumers di¤er in their
taste for environmental characteristics of the good, described by parameter n 2 [; ]
which is uniformly distributed with unit density.11
Assuming that the initial mandatory harvesting constraint is zero in both coun-
tries, we can formulate the demand functions for the two cases relevant to this study
as follows. The rst case is the unilateral design of conservation policy. This means
that country i chooses the conservation level and the country j applies no harvesting
constraints to the domestic forest owners. This implies that that the goods are envi-
ronmentally di¤erentiated, and thus, by assuming partial market coverage, the inverse
demand function can be written as:
P i(qi; qj; hi; hj) = (hi)(  qi)  qj;
P j(qi; qj; hi; hj) =   qj   qi:
when (hi) > 1.12 The demand functions imply that higher (hi) represents an advan-
tage for the rm i: when (hi) > (hj) it can charge a higher price than its rival for
any given output quantity. Higher parameter  readily captures the property that for
9This is a usual formulation of consumers indirect utility in the literature on vertical product
di¤erentiation, see e.g. Motta (1993). Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) examine environmental quality
competition under Bertrand conjectures.
10The determination of laissez faire conservation level will be discussed in section 3.2.
11The taste parameter can be interpreted as a parameter which links the marginal utility of income
to the taste for environmental quality. For more information, see e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995)
12Assuming partial market coverage allows us to invert the demand function (see e.g. Motta 1993).
Observe that although the demand functions express the demand for the goods when (hj) = 1; the
model could readily be extended to the case when (hi) > (hj) > 1.
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the same physical quality, a consumer is willing to pay a higher price if the product
originates from sustainable sources.13 Formally:
dP i(qi; qj; hi; hj)
dhi
= 0(hi)(  qi) > 0 (2.1)
dP j(qi; qj; hi; hj)
dhi
= 0
In the case of a symmetric conservation levels (hi) = (hj) the aggregate demand
for the homogeneous goods is given by (hi)(   qi   qj). A symmetric increase in
the conservation requirements implies that both rms can charge higher price for their
output
dP i(qi; qj; hi; hj)
dhi
=
dP j(qi; qj; hi; hj)
dhj
= 0(hi)(  qi   qj) > 0 (2.2)
Properties (2.1) and (2.2) characterize the price e¤ect associated with the cus-
tomers perception of the productsgreen-image. An increase in conservation require-
ment generates a relative demand advantage for the rm i as the consumers willingness
to pay for the good originating from country i increase as she perceives it being of higher
environmental quality than wood products from country j. An increase in both con-
servation levels induces a similar e¤ect on the prices of each rm. The latter e¤ect
is, however, weaker as the goods are perceived homogenous by the consumers. This
means that neither rm can capitalize on the product-di¤erentiation component of the
green-image demand induced, but the increased willingness to pay for any good on the
market relaxes the price competition in the importing country.
3 Industry Equilibrium and Domestic Timber Mar-
ket
In this section, we describe the competition between the rms and analyze the upstream
markets for timber. As is usual, we work our way backwards starting from the output
stage. The second step involves the analysis of the timber markets. Finally, we examine
13For empirical evidence on the existence of such price premium, see Ozanne and Vlosky (1997) and
Ozanne and Smith (1998).
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the rmsinvestment behavior.
3.1 Output Choice
At the output stage the rms choose output quantities, taking the rivals quantity,
timber price and investment level as given. The prots are written as
i(qi; qj; ki) = P i(qi; qj; hi; hj)qi   Ci(ki; ti; qi)  rki;
j(qi; qj; kj) = P j(qi; qj; hi; hj)qj   Cj(kj; tj; qj)  rkj;
where r denotes the sunk cost of investments.14 Nash-equilibrium in quantities is
characterized by the rst-order conditions:
iqi(q
i; qj; ki) = (hi)  qj   2(hi)qi   Ciqi(ki; ti; qi) = 0; (3.1)
j
qj
(qi; qj; kj) =   2qj   qi   Cj
qj
(kj; tj; qj) = 0; (3.2)
where the second-order and stability conditions are satised.15
Solving the rst-order conditions for qi and qj; we obtain the following closed-form
solutions
qi(ki; kj) = 	
h 
2(hi)  1  2Ciqi(ki; ti; qi) + Cjqj(kj; tj; qj))i (3.3)
qj(ki; kj) =
	
(hi)

  2Cj
qj
(kj; tj; qj) +
1
(hi)
Ciqi(k
i; ti; qi)

; (3.4)
where 	 = 1
4(hi) 1 : Keeping in mind that C
i
qiqi = 0 and C
j
qjqj
= 0; it is straightforward
to see that the output levels are decreasing in domestic timber prices. Furthermore, the
14The parameter r is assumed to be identical in both countries. This simplication reects the
property that the cost of nancing the investments is determined in the international capital markets.
Therefore, it is not implausible to think that the cost of capital is indeed identical for both rms.
15That is,
iqiqi(q
i; qj ; ki) =  2(hi) < 0
iqiqj (q
i; qj ; ki) =  1 < 0;
Hence, D = iqiqi()jqjqj ()   iqiqjjqjqi = 4(hi)   1 > 0: This ensures that the subgame perfect
equilibrium is stable and unique.
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properties of the cost function indicate that output is increasing in own investments
and decreasing in that of the rivals:
qiti (k
i; kj) < 0 and qj
ti
(ki; kj) > 0
qiki(k
i; kj) > 0 and qj
ki
(ki; kj) < 0
This result describes the strategic importance of investment decisions and timber
prices. The equilibrium quantities are determined by the properties of the cost function.
An increase in marginal cost of production reduces the competitiveness of the rm i.
When the rm j observes an increase in timber price or a reduction in investments in
rm is costs, it infers that the resulting reduction in aggregate will increase prices on
the export market. Anticipating this, the rm j is induced to expand its output to
capture a higher market share in the export market.
3.2 Timber price Determination
Domestic timber market consists of a single buyer and a number of potential sellers.
Although this assumption is rather extreme, it captures the stylized fact that producers
of processed wood products have considerable market power in the roundwood markets
in most wood-producing countries.16 In theory, the approach can also be justied by
that the extent to which forest conservation inuences the timber prices does not
qualitatively depend on the degree of competition on the domestic market (Koskela
and Ollikainen 2001). Hence, di¤erent assumptions about the degree of competition
provide little additional insight to the policy analysis which tries to explain the trade-
policy implications of forest conservation.
Consider then a representative forest owner who derives revenue from selling timber
and amenity benets from the share of forest set aside from commercial forestry.17 We
assume that a quasi-linear utility function of the timber harvest describes forest owners
16Murray (1995); and; Bergman and Brannlund (1995) provide empirical evidence that rms indeed
employ oligopsony power on timber markets in USA and Sweden, respectively. Finnish timber market
has a long tradition of periodical timber price negotiations between the forest ownersassociation and
the forest industry. For more information see Koskela and Ollikainen (1998).
17This assumption is in keeping with several studies in forest economics. For instance, Hartman
(1976) argues that forest owners maximize utility over timber revenues and recreational services.
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utility:
V (x) = tix+ v(h) G(x);
s:t: h = X   x
where x denotes the harvesting of forest owner and ti denotes the timber price.18 The
function v(h) describes the forest owners valuation of the non-timber output of the
forest stock left standing, h, and satises v0(h) > 0; v00(h) < 0. Parameter G(x) is a
dummy-variable taking values G(0) = 0; and G(x) = G > 0 for x > 0, denoting a
xed cost of harvesting. The utility function thus captures the property that a corner
solution in the form of clear-cutting the entire forest stock is unfeasible for the forest
insofar as the timber price satises ti  v0(0):
The sale of timber is modeled as a contractual agreement between the representative
forest owner and the domestic rm. An implicit assumption is that the buyer proposes
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the forest owner. To x ideas, consider the outside option
for the forest owner. Given the rms o¤er, ti, this option involves leaving the entire
stock standing and receive V (0) = v(X). It then follows that the optimal o¤er, which
takes this constraint into account, can be dened as
ti = argmin
ti
Ci(ki; ti; qi); (3.5)
s:t: tix+ v(h) G  v(X): (3.6)
Constraint (3.6) states that a feasible price ti ensures a timber revenue no less than
V (X). An optimal o¤er thus involves a minimum unit price which satises (3.6) for
any given x. This can be written as
ti(hi)  v(X)  v(h
i) +G
X   hi : (3.7)
Expression (3.7) denes a reservation price which implicitly determines the quantity of
timber traded between a representative forest owner and rm i.
18For a similar treatment of the forest ownersutility, see Hartman (1976) and Koskela and Ol-
likainen (2001).
28
The solution for the price contract is driven by the properties of the harvesting
problem and the market power of the rm i: First, the harvesting problem has a
non-convex component, indicating that a feasible o¤er ensures timber revenue that
exceeds the xed cost.19 Second, consider the role of harvesting constraints. Absent
binding constraints, the solution for ti = ti is found at the point of tangency between
v(X) v(hi0)+G and tix, which implicitly denes the harvest quantity x = (X hi0) > 0,
where hi0 is the laissez faire level of forest stock left standing by the representative
forest owner. For a given price, a binding constraint, hi = hi0 + h
i
m; implies a one-
to-one reduction in timber harvest. Since the forest ownersoutside option is xed at
V (X); the timber revenue with price ti and harvest x = (X   hi) is too low to induce
harvesting.20 It then follows that the rm i is must increase its o¤er to ensure timber
supply in domestic market.
The following result characterizes the optimal price o¤er for the rm i:
Result 1 Equilibrium timber price is such that:
(i) Timber price equals the reservation price
ti(hi) =
v(X)  v(hi) +G
X   hi
(ii) Forest owners harvest up to constrained level i.e. xi = X   hi:
(iii) Tighter harvesting constraint increases timber price
dti(hi)
dhi
=
ti(hi)  v0(hi)
X   hi > 0:
Proof. See the Appendix
The result just derived implies that forest conservation increases the rate of the lin-
ear price contract between the forest owners and the domestic buyer through a reduced
supply potential of timber. Essentially, this result captures the price e¤ect reported
in Linden and Uusivuori (2002) who estimated the impact of a new forest law, which
19If there were no xed cost the rm could, in principle, set a price ti ! 0 inducing forest owners
to harvest an arbitrary small fraction of their forest stock, x0 = (X   hi)! 0 such that v0(hi) = 0:
20In section 5 we will show that the forest ownersoptimal allocation of h does not coincide with
that of non-forest owners who have no timber revenue. Hence, the optimal conservation policy involves
a binding harvesting constraint.
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came into e¤ect 1997, imposing limitations on the commercial harvesting of timber
in Finland. The law was designed to promote biodiversity in forests modied logging
practices, by reducing the area eligible for harvest and required the forest owners to
leave more standing trees on harvested areas. Linden and Uusivuori established that
conservation requirements in the form of supply constraints induced the forest owners
to increase the price levels to compensate the reduced supply.21
Before turning to the analysis of the green-image demand and industry compe-
tition, we should consider the role of government in imposing mandatory harvesting
constraints. Harvesting constraints are an important component in promoting biolog-
ical diversity and they are employed in most forest certication programs aimed to
inform the consumers about the environmental characteristics of wood products. This
immediately raises the question whether a government intervention is necessary, be-
cause the industry and the forest owners could voluntary engage in improving forest
management practices. In the present model, this means that the rm could condi-
tion the price of timber also on the forest ownersforest management practices. The
information requirements for such program are, however, high as the consumers nd it
virtually impossible to identify a wood product originating from sustainable sources.
This generates a problem of asymmetric information between each link in the product
chain, and thus, industry-led programs might not induce a desired green-image e¤ect.22
A government intervention is therefore justied insofar as it serves as an instrument
providing credible information about the minimum quality standard which the domestic
wood products have to meet. We should also note that the target of the conservation
requirements does not need to be the forest owners, as the same result obtains if the
government applied a minimum quality standard on exported wood products. This
could be seen as a public certication scheme, in which the government would play the
role of a third-party accredidation body.
21A similar forest conservation program has also been launched in Sweden.
22As an example of credibility problems in forest certication see Greenpeace and The Finnish
Natural League (2001), which claims that the Finnish certication program does not ensure sustainable
forest management. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) provide theoretical background in a vertical
di¤erentiation framework for self-regulation. For detailed description of information problems in
industry-led product certication see Janssen and de Faria (2002); Kirchho¤ (2000); and Cason and
Gangadharan (2002).
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3.3 Investment Stage
At the rst stage of the game, the rms choose the level of investments. Letting
i[qi(); qj()]  i(ki; kj), we can write the rm is program as
max
fkig
i(ki; kj) = P i(qi; qj; hi; hj)qi   Ci(ki; ti; qi)  rki;
s:t: qi = qi(ki; kj); qj = qj(ki; kj) and
ti = ti(hi)
The rm chooses its level of investments given the e¤ect of additional investments
on output and timber demand assuming the rival keeps its investments xed. Using the
envelope theorem, we obtain a rst-order condition characterizing the Nash-equilibrium
in investments for the rm i
iki(k
i; kj) =  qj
ki
(ki; kj)qi(ki; kj)  Ciki(ki; ti; qi)  r = 0;
where the second-order condition holds for each rm. Under mild assumptions about
the properties of the cost function, the following condition holds
A = ikiki(k
i; kj)j
kjkj
(ki; kj)  ikikj(ki; kj)jkjki(ki; kj) > 0: (3.8)
This ensures that the equilibrium is stable and unique.23 The sign of ikikj(k
i; kj) < 0;
implies that investments are strategic substitutes.24
The rst-order condition restates the usual property in oligopoly-games with Cournot
conjectures that the rms tend to over-invest in cost-reducing technologies so as to
establish a credible pre-commitment to higher output level at the nal stage of the
game. However, since both producers have the same conjecture, the equilibrium in-
volves higher aggregate output levels, which is conducive to more competitive prices
in the output market and thereby lower prots than in the case of cost-minimizing
investment levels.25
23The second-order conditions and (3.8) hold, provided that e¤ect of investments on timber pro-
ductivity declines sharply (i.e. Cikiki is su¢ ciently large).
24See Bulow et al. (1985).
25The cost minimizing level kim is given by 
i
ki(k
i; kj) = Ciki(k
i
m; t
i; qi)  r = 0.
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The analysis of the rmsinvestment behavior indicates that investments do not
inuence the equilibrium outcomes in domestic timber markets or the consumersper-
ception of the goods green-image. This is because the vertical separation of the produc-
tion of the nal goods implies that timber prices are determined between the atomistic
forest owners and the rm, whose investment behavior does inuence the contractual
environment in the domestic timber market. Furthermore, we assume that the green
image demand reects the perceived forest management practices of the forest owners
and there are no environmental externalities associated with production of processed
wood products. This simplication arguably neglects the importance of the chain-of-
custody issues in many forest certication programs, but it allows us to focus on forest
conservation in more detail.
4 Industry Equilibrium and Forest Conservation
Section 2 established that conservation a¤ects the rmsrevenue through higher prices
of the nal good. The analysis of the rmsoutput decision and the timber price de-
termination revealed that conservation, however, increases timber prices and therefore
the rmsproduction costs. This section analyzes how these e¤ects combined a¤ect
the industry equilibrium in terms of the rmsoutput and the investment decisions.
The equilibrium analysis is a comparative static exercise around the equilibrium.
The results will be obtained with the help of the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (i) The e¤ect of a unilateral change in the conservation level hi on the
industry equilibrium is determined by the following single-crossing property which holds
for any equilibrium output qi :
9 h 2 [hi0; 1) s:t:
@2i(ki; kj)
@qi@hi

q(ki;kj)=qi
8<:  0 for hi  h< 0 for hi > h; (SC1)
where @
2i(ki;kj)
@qi@hi
= 0(hi)(  2qi)  ti0(hi):
(ii) In the case of symmetric change in the conservation policies, i.e. dh = dhi =
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dhj, the single-crossing property becomes
9 h < h s:t: @
2i(ki; kj)
@qi@h

q(ki;kj)=qi
8<:  0 for hi  h< 0 for hi > h; (SC2)
where @
2i(ki;kj)
@qi@hi
= 0(hi)(  qj   2qi)  ti0(hi):
Proof. See the Appendix
The expressions (SC1) and (SC2) illustrate the e¤ects of higher conservation re-
quirements on the rmsmarginal revenue of additional units of output. On the demand
side, a higher mandatory conservation requirement increases the consumerswilling-
ness to pay for the rms output which increases the marginal revenue of additional
units of output. On the supply side, however, conservation requirements increase the
production cost as the timber prices increase in the domestic markets.26 The combined
e¤ect on the marginal revenue is determined by a unique critical parameter level which
is lower when both governments modify their conservation requirements.
The intuition for the result is simple: a unilateral change in hi di¤erentiates rm
is product from other products on the market. This allows the rm i to charge higher
price for its output, because the green-image e¤ect reecting the consumersperception
that the product has a higher environmental quality. In the case of bilateral change
in conservation requirements, the rms cannot capitalize on this di¤erentiation e¤ect
as the consumers consider the products homogeneous. It follows immediately that the
increase in timber price is more likely to dominate the green-image demand e¤ect.
The following result further examines the implications of Lemma 1 on the rms
output decisions:
Result 2 (i) In the presence of green-image demand, the impact of marginal increase
26Since the unit price of timber in convex in hi, the positive e¤ect on rms marginal revenue
decreases with higher conservation levels and turns negative for parameters values hi > h.
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in conservation level hi is given by:
dqi
dhi
=
8<: > 0 for h > hi< 0 for h < hi and dk
i
dhi
=
8<: > 0 for h > hi< 0 for h < hi
dqj
dhi
=
8<: < 0 for h > hi> 0 for h < hi and dk
j
dhi
=
8<: < 0 for h > hi> 0 for h < hi
(ii) The e¤ect of a symmetric change in the conservation policies is identical to
both rms, i.e.
dqf
dh
=
8<: > 0 for h > h< 0 for h < h and dk
f
dh
=
8<: > 0 for h > h< 0 for h < h;
where f = i; j.
Proof. See the Appendix
The rst result can be understood intuitively in the following way: a unilateral
increase in the conservation requirement increases the consumerswillingness to pay
for rm is output, and consequently, the rm i expands its output and investments in
order to capitalize on the price premium generated by the green-image e¤ect. The rival
anticipates the increase in the aggregate output and reduces its output to alleviate the
downward pressure on the prices. This e¤ect is reversed if the premium is lower than
the marginal increase in timber prices, because the rm i is induced to contract its
output and investments. Anticipating the increase in the prices of the nal good, the
rm j increases its output in order to capture a higher share of the export market.
Result (ii) examines the equilibrium implications when both countries modify their
conservation policies. A bilateral increase in h has a similar e¤ect on the rmsoutput
and investment decision, but when the raise is symmetric, the consumerswillingness
to pay is higher for any good on the market. As a result, the product di¤erentiation
component of green-image demand does not show up in demand. This means that
each rm is less likely to increase its output and investments as a response to higher
conservation requirement than in the case of unilateral policy scheme.
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5 Policy Stage: Optimal Conservation Level
The policy analysis considers two cases. In the case of a unilateral policy decision,
the government j keeps its conservation policy xed and the government of country i
assumes the role of rst-mover of the game. In a non-cooperative policy game both
countries simultaneously and independently impose conservation requirements.
The analysis is in three steps. First, we characterize the governmentsproblem.
Second, we solve for the rst-best policy. The rst-best policy refers to an outcome
which obtains under the assumption that government does not recognize the e¤ects of
the policy on the export market. Second, we determine the optimal policy schedule
when the government designs the policy with an attention to the responses of the agents
located in the foreign countries. Finally, we compare the policy outcomes and discuss
the welfare implications.
5.1 Unilateral Policy Decision
Suppose that the government of country i sets the forest conservation requirements
it applies to the forest owners so as to maximize domestic welfare. Letting (1   F i)
denote the proportion of non-forest owners over the entire population, the governments
problem can be stated as
max
fhig
W i(hi; hj) = i(ki; kj) + (1  F i)vs(hi); (5.1)
s:t: hj = hif
where (1   F i)vs(hi) describes the social benet of forest conservation reecting the
utility of non-forest owners in terms non-timber output, such as biodiversity and ameni-
ties, of forests. The function vs(hi) has the same properties as forest ownersfunction
v(hi).27
Let us then illustrate the rst-best solution to (5.1) which will be used as a bench-
27It is important to note that forest ownerspayo¤ function does not enter the welfare function,
because the contract leaves the forest owners at their reservation utility which is constant in hi.
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mark case in each country. The rst-best level can be dened as follows:
hif = argmax W
i(hi; hj0)
s:t: 0(hi) = 0 and
dqj
dhi
= 0
where the constraints reect the presumption that the government does not recognize
the impact of its choice on the industry equilibrium. The following rst-order condition
gives an implicit solution to this policy schedule:
@W i(hi; hj0)
@hi
= (1  F i)vs0(hif )  qit0(hif ) = 0; (5.2)
where qit0(hi) expresses a marginal increase in rm is costs due to higher timber price.
Policy hif thus satises the usual rst-best rule in environmental economics: Marginal
social benet of conservation equals the marginal economic cost in the form of an
increase in domestic timber prices.28
The next step in the analysis involves the determination of strategically optimal
conservation level, his. The denition of h
i
s is
his = argmax W
i(hi; hj0)
s:t: 0(hi)  0 and dq
j
dhi
8<: < 0 for h > his> 0 for h < his
where the constraints describe the consequences of domestic policy on industry equilib-
rium derived in Result 2. Using the envelope theorem, we obtain a rst-order condition
which implicitly characterizes the solution to (5.1). Rearranging the rst-order condi-
tion gives:
(1  F i)vs0(his)  qit0(his) =  iqj(ki; kj)

@qj
@hi
+
@qj
@kj
@kj
@hi

  0(his)(a  qi)qi: (5.3)
The right hand side of (5.3) illustrates the two e¤ects which address the implications
28Observe that an optimal constraint is always binding. This is because a non-binding constraint
hi < hi0 implies t
0(hi) = 0. Such constraint cannot constitute an optimal policy as the solution to
governments problem implies vs0(hi) = 0 for hi < hi0 indicating no supply of timber in country i.
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of forest conservation policy we are discussing and the sign of the sum of these e¤ects
determines the potential distortions in the forest conservation policy.
We refer the rst e¤ect as the output e¤ect, because it describes the rm js re-
sponse to forest conservation policy in quantity-space. This e¤ect essentially restates
the Brander and Spencers (1985) analysis of export subsidies: A higher conservation
requirement will increase domestic timber prices making the domestic rm less compet-
itive, and by Lemma 1 it is clear that when this increase in timber price is su¢ ciently
high, the foreign rm j is induced to expand its output harming the domestic rm.
The second e¤ect is the price e¤ect reecting the consumersdirect response to the
change in the rmspositioning in quality space. A raise in conservation requirements
the government applies to forest owners di¤erentiates the domestic wood products from
other products on the export market. As a result, the green-image e¤ect increases the
consumerswillingness to pay for wood products originating from country i; which
segments the market and allows rm i to charge higher price for its output. This e¤ect
gives the government an incentive to impose higher conservation requirements so as to
generate a market environment in which the domestic rm can capitalize on the price
premium.
Using Result 2, we can determine the policy distortions resulting from governments
strategic behavior. These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Strategically optimal forest conservation level is always higher than h;
hence, the output e¤ect in (5.3) is positive. The optimal policy schedule exhibits the
following properties:
(i) When hif  h, the strategically optimal policy is higher than the rst-best, i.e.
his  hif ;
(ii) When hif  h; an increase in hi decreases the output of rm j: Hence, the
strategically optimal conservation level is higher than the rst-best, unless the output
e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for this result is simple. A marginal increase in the conservation
requirement in country i induces the forest owners to raise the price of timber. This
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e¤ect passes into the rm is costs and, consequently, the output of rm i is displaced
by that of rm j. However, when the rst-best conservation requirement is su¢ ciently
low, so that the impact of marginal increase in harvesting constraint on timber price
is relatively small, the positive green-image demand e¤ect on the demand side of the
market is likely to dominate the cost-e¤ect. It then follows that the optimal strategy
for the government i entails increasing both domestic income and the non-forest owners
utility by imposing higher conservation requirements.
The relationship between strategically optimal and the rst-best conservation policy
is, however, reversed when the demand e¤ect is weak. Consumers on the export market
appreciate the higher environmental quality o¤ered by the rm i, but the higher price
of domestic timber induces a contraction in the rms output and prot nevertheless.
Anticipating this, the government is induced to impose a lower harvesting constraint
than the rst-best. This implies that the government engages in ecological dumping in
the sense that it chooses ine¢ ciently low conservation requirements in order improve
the competitiveness of the domestic rm through lower timber prices.29
5.2 Non-cooperative Policy Game
The results just derived show that the government of country i has an incentive to
behave strategically and modify the forest conservation policy in order to increase the
domestic rms prot in the export market. It is therefore plausible to think that
the government of country j would also behave strategically. To illustrate the welfare
implications of such non-cooperative policy process, we consider a game in which both
governments simultaneously choose the conservation levels taking as given the other
governments conservation level.30
Since the maximization problem and the information set of both governments is
identical to (5.1), the optimal strategies in the policy game coincide with the one
described in Proposition 1. Hence, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium of the bilateral policy game exhibits the following fea-
tures.
29For more detailed discussion on ecological dumpingsee Rauscher (1994).
30Our approach is similar to that in Barrett (1994).
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(i) The equilibrium policies coincide with the optimal conservation requirements
derived in Proposition 1, i.e. his = h
j
s.
(ii) When h  hif and the output e¤ect (price e¤ect) dominates the price e¤ect
(output e¤ect), each rm produces more (less) than in the case of rst-best policy,
implying a lower (higher) welfare in both countries.
(iii) When h  hif < h the equilibrium policies induce the rms to produce less
than in the case of rst-best conservation policy. As a result, the rms have higher
revenue-levels, implying an increase in welfare in both countries.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The second result in Proposition 2 can be linked to the usual PrisonersDilemma
outcome in the policy game between the governments. Absent green-image e¤ects both
governments try to increase the domestic rms rents by relaxing the environmental
regulation. As a result, adverse policy equilibrium emerges as it involves higher ag-
gregate output and lower industry prots. In addition to lower domestic income, the
low conservation requirements exacerbate the environmental damages in the form of
ine¢ ciently high levels of logging in the forests of the producing countries.31 In the
present model this outcome emerges as equilibrium when the governments perceive
the green-image demand e¤ect insu¢ cient to increase domestic prots on the export
market and impose lower conservation requirements to domestic forest owners so as to
prevent the increase in timber prices.32
When the governments perceive that the green-image demand is strong enough, the
policy equilibrium entails higher conservation requirements than the rst-best. This
equilibrium does not exhibit similar PrisonersDilemma outcome as the one discussed
above. The reason is that the policy decision is a¤ected by the conjecture that rais-
ing conservation requirements will implement equilibrium in which the domestic wood
products are di¤erentiated from other products on the market. Since both governments
have the same conjecture, the unintended consequence is that the product di¤erenti-
ation e¤ect does not show up in demand implying lower output levels and thereby
31Here ine¢ ciently low refers to the comparison between rst-best and strategically optimal con-
servation levels.
32This is indeed a strategically stable equilibrium, because neither government has an incentive to
shift back to the rst-best policy schedule.
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higher revenues for both rms. This outcome also exhibits a Pareto improvement as
non-forest owners and industries in producing countries are better o¤ due to higher
industry revenues and tighter environmental regulation.
We should also note that Proposition 2 can be used as an argument for promoting
certication programs designed and managed by the importing countries. More speci-
cally, consider a straightforward extension of the present model in which the importing
country imposes a set of standards including the harvesting constraints that the ex-
porters have to meet in order to receive an environmental certication. Provided that
the certication could be credibly monitored and it would induce the same green-image
demand e¤ect, the importing country could implement an outcome with the same equi-
librium characteristics as the non-cooperative policy game under strong green image
demand e¤ects. The reason is that since the equilibrium of the non-cooperative pol-
icy game is strategically stable, a unilateral conservation requirement imposed by the
importing country would induce both exporting countries to comply with the stan-
dards, and thus, the industry equilibrium would coincide with the one established in
Proposition 2.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the design of optimal forest conservation requirements. The
results establish that tighter conservation requirement tend to increase timber price on
domestic market and thereby mitigate the domestic rms incentives to invest in cost
reducing technology, leading to contraction in domestic exports. The negative income
e¤ect thus provides an incentive for the governments to relax the conservation levels for
trade policy purposes. The analysis of equilibrium of a non-cooperative policy game
restates the usual PrisonersDilemma aspect in traditional strategic trade models as
low conservation requirements reduce environmental quality and industry revenues.
The case for lowering the conservation requirements is less clear when conservation
policy inuences productspositioning in quality-space. If the price premium generated
by the nal products green-image is high enough, a higher conservation level induces
an output expansion and increases investments. This increases domestic prots, and
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therefore, the government has an incentive to impose tighter conservation requirement
than the rst-best level. Green-image demand also mitigates the adverse welfare out-
come in the policy game. When both countries impose conservation requirements, the
policies do not have the anticipated product-di¤erentiation e¤ect. As a result, the equi-
librium policies, initially aimed to improve the wood products green image, implement
equilibrium with lower aggregate output, higher industry revenues and higher amenity
and biodiversity benets generated by reduced logging in producing countries.
The results indicate that precise information about the conditions surrounding the
oligopoly competition is needed. An interesting extension would allow for incomplete
information about the parameters of the model and incentive-compatible conservation
policies. The policies could be modeled as menus of contracts, which induce the rms
to reveal information about demand and cost e¤ects of the conservation policy.33 Also,
we considered incentives for non-cooperative, unilateral, government behavior, which
is naturally welfare inferior to the joint-maximizing optimum. It is plausible to think
that the policy makers would be willing to cooperate, when governments choose their
forest conservation schedules.
Appendix
Proof of Result 1. (i) Argues that optimal o¤er involves xi = X   hi. Actual
contract is linear in price and harvest, optimal o¤er is thus decreasing in x; for an
increase in forest owners timber revenue allows for reduction in price o¤er. Formally,
di¤erentiating the contract price ti(hi) with respect to x gives dti(hi)=dxi = [v0(h)  
ti(h)]=x < 0. Given hi; it is easy to see that optimal o¤er by the rm i is ti(hi):
(ii) Follows directly from (i)
(iii) Totally di¤erentiate (3.6) at ti(hi) to obtain
xdt  [t  v0(h)]dh = 0:
33For more information on strategic-trade policy under incomplete information, see for example
Maggi (1999). Nannerup (1998) examines the strategic issues in the design of environmental policies
under incomplete information.
41
This gives
dti(hi)
dhi
=
ti(hi)  v0(hi)
X   hi
Given (i) we know that harvesting constraint is binding, thus, the numerator can be
determined through the rst-order conditions to the solution of the following forest
owners constrained harvesting problem:
maxL(x; ) = ti(hi)x+ v(hi) + (X   hi   x);
where  is the Lagrange-multiplier which reects the shadow price of harvesting. The
rst-order conditions are
@L(x; )
@x
= ti(hi)  v0(hi)   = 0
@L(x; )
@
= X   hi   x = 0;
This implies ti(hi)  v0(hi) =  > 0; hence dti(hi)=dhi > 0:
Proof of Lemma 1 . (i) The rst-order condition (3.1) indicates that ( 2qi) >
0: Functions (hi) and ti(hi) are continuous on the domain hi 2 (0; X): Hence, hi ! 0
implies ti0(hi) = 0 and 0(hi) > 0: Furthermore, hi ! X implies ti0(hi) > 0 and
0(hi) = 0: It follows that there is a single point of intersection between 0(hi)(  2qi)
and t0(hi), say h. At this point 0(hi)(  2qj)  t0(hi) = 0 holds, and
0(hi)(  2qi)  t0(hi) < 0 for h < hi
0(hi)(  2qi)  t0(hi) > 0 for h > hi:
(ii) The proof follows immediately from the proof of (i) and from the rst-order
conditions (3.1) and (3.2).
Proof of Result 2. The proof of the rst part of (i) is straightforward and
therefore omitted.
The second part argues that dq
i
dhi
> 0; dq
j
dhi
< 0; dk
i
dhi
> 0 and dk
j
dhi
< 0 i¤ hi < h: The
impact on output follows immediately from Lemma 1, (3.3) and (3.4). To derive the
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e¤ect on investments we totally di¤erentiate the rst-order conditions for both rms.
This gives 24 ikiki ikikj
j
kjki
j
kjkj
3524 dki
dkj
35 =  
24 ikihidhi
j
kjhi
dhi
35
where ikiki(k
i; kj) < 0, j
kjkj
(ki; kj) < 0, ikikj(k
i; kj) < 0, j
kjki
(ki; kj) < 0 and
ikih(k
i; kj) =  qj
ki
(ki; kj)qih(k
i; kj)  Cikiqi(ki; ti; qj)qih(ki; kj) = r
qih(k
i; kj)
qi(ki; kj)
j
kjh
(ki; kj) =  qikj(ki; kj)qjh(ki; kj)  Cjkjqj(kj; tj; qj)qjh(ki; kj) = r
qjh(k
i; kj)
qj(ki; kj)
where, qih(k
i; kj) > (<)0 if hi < (>)h: Hence, i
kih
(ki; kj) > (<)0 and j
kjh
(ki; kj) <
(>)0 if hi < (>)h: Using Cramers rule, the comparative static exercise gives us the
following results
dki
dhi
=
 i
kihi
j
kjkj
+j
kjhi
ikikj
A
8<: > 0 for hi < h< 0 for hi > h
dkj
dhi
=
 ikikijkjhi +ikihijkjki
A
8<: > 0 for hi > h< 0 for hi < h
Applying similar methods to the case of bilateral increase in h readily shows that
the second part of Result 2 also holds.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proofs of the general result his > h and (i)
are by contradiction. The rst-order condition characterizing the strategically optimal
conservation level is
iqj(k
i; kj)

@qj
@hi
+
@qj
@kj
@kj
@hi

+ 0(his)(a  qi)qi   qit0(his) + (1  F i)vs0(his) = 0; (A1)
where
iqj(k
i; kj)

@qj
@hi
+
@qj
@kj
@kj
@hi

> 0; and
0(his)[a  qi   t0(his)] > 0 for his < h
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hence, his < h is a contradicts (A1). Similarly, when h
i
f < h; the optimal level satises
his >
hif .
The proof of result (ii) follows from the observation that
9eh > h s:t: iqj(ki; kj)| {z }
 

@qj
@hi
+
@qj
@kj
@kj
@hi

| {z }
+
+ 0(his)(a  qi)qi| {z }
+
= 0:
Hence, for hif < eh (hif > eh) the optimal conservation level is his > hif .(his < hif )
Proof of Proposition 2. Proof of (i) follows immediately from Proposition 1.
To prove (ii); totally di¤erentiate the welfare function of country i with respect to hi
and hj to obtain
dW i(hif ;
hjf ) =
@i(ki; kj)
@hi
dhi +
@i(ki; kj)
@hj
dhj + (1  F i)vs0(hi)dhi
where
di(ki; kj)
dhi
=
di(ki; kj)
dqj

@qj
@hi
+
@qj
@kj
@kj
@hi

+ 0(hif )(a  qi)qi   qit0(his);
di(ki; kj)
dhj
=
di(ki; kj)
dqj

@qj
@hj
+
@qj
@kj
@kj
@hj

  0(hjf )qj
Imposing symmetry, dhi = dhj; the properties of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium indi-
cate that
sign

@qj
@hi
+
@qj
@kj
@kj
@hi

= sign

@qj
@hj
+
@qj
@kj
@kj
@hj

;
0(hif )(a  qi)qi   0(hjf )qj = 0(hif )(a  qi   qj)qi > 0
Next, observe that h > h; i.e. a bilateral, symmetric increase in h
i
and h
j
reduces the
output of each rm insofar as h
i
f  h: Proposition 1 indicates: dh
i
< 0 for h
i
f >
eh and
dh
i
> 0 for h
i
f <
eh. Hence, by Result 2 and Proposition 1 we infer that
dW i(hif ;
hjf )
8<: < 0 for h
i
f >
eh
> 0 for h
i
f < h
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Result (iii) follows immediately from the proof of (ii) and the fact that dh
i
> 0 for
h
i
f < h.
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Essay II: Optimal Forest Conservation Under
Endogenous Mode of Competition: The Role of
Timber Imports
Abstract
This paper develops a model, in which forest owners bargain over timber
prices with a rm that produces wood products for the export-market. The
oligopoly-competition in the export-market is endogenous and the outcome of
the game ranges between Cournot and Bertrand, depending on the extent to
which timber importation diminishes the commitment-value of domestic timber
inputs. This model is employed to examine the role of timber importation in the
design for forest conservation policies. The results show that low cost of importa-
tion allows for the design for a rst-best conservation policy, as the use domestic
timber inputs becomes a less important determinant of the rmscompetitive-
ness. In addition, a lower cost of importation decreases timber and nal-good
prices, and hence, diminishes the forest ownersharvest revenue.
Keywords: Strategic trade, environmental policy, timber imports, timber
price bargaining
JEL Classication: F12, F18, Q28
1 Introduction
An interesting trend has been detected in the international forest industry. Many
rms are importing timber inputs which formerly would have been acquired from lo-
cal forests. This has directed attention in discussion of forest conservation onto two
overlapping issues. Increase in the international demand for industrial wood has raised
concerns for deforestation in tropical rain forests, as well as in forests of Asian Siberia
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and Western Russia.1 At the same time, some argue that while globalization imposes
economic pressure on these valuable ecosystems, it also provides opportunities for for-
est conservation in the major industrialized countries exporting wood products as the
supply of wood inputs will be increasingly conned to areas with high productivity and
intensive management.2
In major wood-producing countries, processed wood-products account for a large
share of total exports. Forest conservation increases the cost of forest management or
decreases forest ownerstimber revenue. These e¤ects tend to increase timber price,
and give a raise to a trade-o¤ between ecological benets and economic costs in terms
industriescompetitiveness. The basic conservation problem in the case of industri-
alized countries that produce processed wood-products thus resembles the problem of
the optimal design of environmental policies in the presence of international trade and
local environmental externalities. In particular, since most large exporters
Several authors have examined the distortions in national environmental policies
generated by international trade. Barrett (1994) uses a similar set-up as Brander and
Spencer (1985) and establishes that regulators have an incentive to use environmental
policy as an indirect output subsidy to shift rents toward domestic rms. The key
idea underlying the results is that export subsidies, or indirect subsidies in the form
of ine¢ ciently low environmental requirements, constitute a credible pre-commitment
for the domestic rm to increase output or prices on the export-market. The policies
can thus be used to increase the prot of the domestic rm. A particular theoretical
weakness of the strategic trade theory, however, emerges in several studies. Eaton
and Grossman (1986) establish that the sign of optimal policy in Brander and Spencer
(1985) is reversed, if one presumes Bertrand conjectures instead of Cournot. More
specically, under price competition the optimal policy calls for export tax rather than
subsidy. Similarly, a strategically optimal environmental policy entails an ine¢ ciently
high environmental requirements, when the rms compete on the basis of Bertrand
1Forests of former Soviet Union, especially, in western Russia and Asian Siberia accounts for more
than 20% of worlds forests. Improvements in the transportation system in these regions, implies that
gaining access to these forests will potentially have an important impact on trade ows of industrial
wood inputs.
2See e.g. Sedjo (2001).
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competition.3
Maggi (1996) examines the sensitivity of these results to assumptions about the
mode of competition, and considers a strategic trade-policy model, in which the mode
of competition is endogenous. The model develops a two-stage game, where the rms
rst choose output capacities and then compete on the basis of capacity-constrained
price competition. The mode of competition is endogenous, because the rms have an
option to produce in excess to a predetermined capacity-level, and the cost of produc-
ing beyond chosen capacity determines the extent to which the rms can use capacities
to relax the price competition at the production-stage. Reecting the feature that
the model is, essentially, a reduced form version of a seminal paper by Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983), Maggi (1996) shows that the mode of competition approaches to
Cournot benchmark, when the cost of producing in excess of capacity is high enough.
However, when the capacity constraint becomes exible, the market equilibrium coin-
cides with that of pure Bertrand competition. In what comes to optimal trade and in-
dustrial policies, the conclusion is that a capacity subsidy is weakly welfare-improving,
regardless of the particularities of the market studied.
The concept of capacity pre-commitment is arguably an important feature in imper-
fectly competitive markets. Especially, in the case of vertical markets, where upstream
producers sell inputs to manufacturers of the nal goods, the role of inputs as capac-
ity constraints cannot be ignored. However, the previous research on strategic trade
and environmental policy in the presence of vertical markets has not been conclusive.4
The present study extends the literature on strategic environmental policy and forest
conservation in this respect. First, it develops a model of a forest industry in the
presence of timber trade, when domestic rm produces processed wood products for
an export-market and domestic timber price is determined endogenously. Second, the
3Barrett (1994) focuses on the role of market conduct in environmental policy decisions, and
e¤ectiveness of such policies as a trade policy instruments. Ulph (1996) extends this framework and
allows for multi-stage competition. Rauscher (1994) examines policy decisions in general equilibrium
framework. For a survey see Ulph (1997).
4To the authors knowledge, the only paper that examines strategic environmental policy and input
markets is Hamilton and Requate (2004). Hamilton and Requate show that when rms buy polluting
inputs from upstream producers, they can use contractual arrangements to implement an optimal cost
structure so that environmental policy has no e¤ect on their competitiveness. However, despite the
feature that the contract implicitly species rmsoutput capacities, the model does not consider the
role of inputs as a capacity constraint.
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model illustrates how capacity constraints generated by the input market inuence the
design of optimal environmental policy.5 Finally, unlike Maggi (1996), we consider a
model in which the cost of capacity is determined endogenously in national timber
market, which is also a¤ected by the policy decisions.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows. Although the rms producing
exported wood-products do not engage in timber importation, a lower cost of import-
ing timber induces more competitive pricing on the export-market for the nal goods
and depresses the prices in the domestic timber market. This result has two welfare
implications. First, the downward pressure on the domestic timber prices diminishes
the forest ownersharvest revenue. Second, a low cost of timber importation allows
for the design for rst-best conservation requirements as the price of domestic timber
inputs becomes a less important determinant of the rmscompetitiveness. However,
optimal policy calls for a lower conservation requirement than the rst-best, when the
use of domestic timber inputs has its full value as a commitment-device.
The last result entails a qualication to the usual ndings on strategic environmental-
policy in the sense that the optimal policy is less sensitive to assumptions about the
mode of competition. The intuition is that the option to engage in timber importa-
tion makes the export market less sensitive to asymmetric changes in domestic timber
prices. As a result, the economic cost of higher conservation requirements in the form
of reduction in domestic rms share of the export market diminishes. Contrary to the
usual ndings in the literature on strategic environmental policy, this means that the
optimal policy coincides with the one that would obtain under perfectly competitive
international markets for the nal goods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section introduces
the structure of the model, and, describes forest ownersutility and the rmscost
structures. Section 3 examines the price competition on the export-market. Section
4 derives the equilibrium outcomes of the game between the rms and describes the
bargaining process, whose outcome determines the price and the quantity of domestic
timber traded at domestic market. Section 5 analyses optimal forest conservation
5Section two provides more detailed discussion on the extent to which timber inputs can be con-
sidered as a commitment device.
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policies, and section 6 concludes. The Appendices consist of most of the proofs and
some derivations of the main results.
2 The Model: Timber Supply and Costs
The model entails two countries, so that country-specic variables and functions are
denoted with superscripts i and j. We assume that in each country there is a forest
industry consisting of a rm that produces processed wood products for the export-
market and a competitive fringe of rms producing a non-tradable good for the domestic
market.6 The rms have the option to buy timber inputs from domestic forest owners
or import the inputs from the international market.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the rst stage, regulator of country i
chooses a forest conservation requirement that it applies to domestic forest owners. At
the second stage, forest owners and the rm bargain over timber prices.7 This process
determines the timber prices and the rms then unilaterally decide upon the quantity
of timber inputs they acquire from the forest owners. Finally, after the national timber
markets have cleared, each rm observes the capacity constraints determined by the
quantity of domestic timber acquired in the domestic market and choose prices of the
nal goods. At this stage the rms have the option to expand production beyond the
chosen input capacity, but this requires timber importation.8
6Although the assumptions about the structure of the domestic and export market are introduced
in order to highlight the strategic trade argument in forest conservation policy, the qualitative results
do not depend on the number of rms or which particular rm produces for export markets in each
country. One interpretation of the approach is that the exporting rm is in fact a representative of few
identical replications. Since the international market for rened wood products, such as ne paper and
wood ber, is dominated by relatively few wood producing countries, the assumption of imperfectly
competitive export-market is plausible. The assumption about perfectly competitive domestic market,
in turn, reects the observation that the market for less processed products, say sawtimber, is often
local and consists of many small retailers.
7Observations in some wood producing countries lend little support to assumption on perfectly
competitive timber markets. Due to high trade costs of timber inputs, forest owners can employ market
power that is associated with spatial monopsony in each wood producing country (see Johansson and
Löfgren (1985) chapter 8). Recent economic literature also provides empirical evidence on timber
market imperfections. See, for example, Koskela and Ollikainen (1998); and Bergman and Brännlund
(1995).
8It is worth noting that the e¤ect timber trade on international forest industry is becoming more
pronounced. Recent empirical studies show that global export-volumes of industrial roundwood have
increased by 22 percent since 1970 to 1997, see, e.g. Bourke and Leitch (2000).
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The analysis of the last two stages of the game follows closely the model of oligopoly
competition presented in Maggi (1996). The output capacity determines the conditions
for the price competition at the following stage where the rms engage in capacity
constrained price competition. The capacity level is explicitly modeled as the volume
of timber inputs traded at the domestic market. Hence, the analysis departs from
Maggi (1996) in that the cost of capacity is endogenously determined.
The assumption that domestic timber inputs can be used to establish a capacity pre-
commitment, is open to the criticism that rms cannot recognize their market power
as sellers of the nal goods, and thereby act non-strategically in timber markets. The
justication for our approach is that, in practice, the rms can change their price more
quickly than the amount of timber they have acquired. Hence, after lowering prices
the rmsability to meet all the forthcoming demand, depends on whether the rms
can procure additional timber inputs without frictions in the domestic timber markets.
Provided that there are such frictions and the cost of timber importation is high, it is
not implausible to think that domestic supply of timber is a capacity constraint, and
the extent to which this constraint is binding depends on the cost of acquiring timber
from alternative locations.
Harvesting Decision of a Representative Forest Owner: Forest owners
utility consists of harvest revenue and amenity benets generated by the forest stock
left standing.9 Timber price ti is determined by negotiations between the forest owners
and the buyer. The negotiations specify a linear price the rm pays to forest owners
in exchange for industrial roundwood.
Representative forest owners utility can be written as a function of timber harvest,
i.e.
U(x) = tix+ v(m) G(x); (2.1)
s:t: m = M   x
where x denotes harvesting and function v(m) denotes forest owners amenity valuation
9Several studies in forest economics argue that forest owners in addition to harvest revenues also
value amenity benets of forests. See, e.g. Hartman (1976).
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of forest stock that is left standing.10 This can be expressed as m = M   x; where
M denotes the initial forest stock. We assume that v(m) satises @v(m)=@m > 0;
@2v(m)=@m2 < 0. Parameter G(x) is a dummy-variable that takes values G(0) = 0;
and G(x) = G > 0 for x > 0: Variable G(x) denotes a xed cost of harvesting and
captures the feature that timber sales entail costs which are independent of harvest
quantity.
To illustrate the forest owners harvesting decision, let x denote laissez-faire level of
timber harvest. Keeping in mind that U(0) = v(M) and setting U(x)jti=bti = U(0); we
obtain the reservation price, bti(m); representing the lowest acceptable price for which
the sells a quantity x =M  m:
ti  bti(m) = v(M)  v(m) +G
M  m : (2.2)
In what comes to forest conservation policy and forest ownersharvesting decisions,
we assume that the regulator can apply mandatory harvesting constraints to forest
owners. Formally, a binding harvesting constraint, m > m, is such that x > M   m.
In the Appendix A, we show that the reservation price is increasing in m:
dbt
dm
=

M  m > 0; (2.3)
where  is the Lagrange-multiplier of forest ownersconstrained utility maximization
problem.11 This e¤ect can be understood intuitively in the following way. Binding
conservation requirement decreases representative forest owners timber revenue. Since
the forest owners timber revenue is linear in x; but the outside option is xed, a feasible
contract requires the buyer to compensate the welfare loss through a higher unit price.
Production Costs: An exporting rm i produces output Qi with timber xi. By
choice of units, we assume a linear production technology which satises dQi=dxi = 1
for all Qi. The rm is cost function consists of two components. The rm pays a linear
10While harvesting decision is fundamentally a dynamic problem, this approach can be justied by
a notion that harvesting decisions are made around a stable steady state. For a similar treatment of
the forest ownersutility, see Koskela and Ollikainen (2000).
11The reason why the forest owners always harvest up to constrained level is that variable G(x)
introduces a nonconvex component to forest ownersharvesting problem. This ensures that ti ! 0 is
not a feasible price.
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price, ti, for each unit of timber they buy from the forest owners before the production
takes place. Furthermore, at the production stage the rm incurs a cost c of producing
one additional unit of Qi.12 Given timber price ti, rm i may thus produce up to
level Qi = xi with xed total cost (ti + c)Qi. Firms may also import timber inputs to
produce in excess of xi, but this requires a cost t =  + s; where  is the world market
timber price and s is transportation cost.13 Hence, rm is cost function can be written
as
Ci = (c+ ti)Qi for Qi  xi;
C
i
= (c+ ti)xi +
 
c+ t

(Qi   xi) for Qi > xi;
where Ci expresses the production costs when rm i uses domestic timber only, and C
i
denotes the production costs when rm i imports a proportion (Qi   xi)=Qi of timber
inputs.
The key feature in the model is that the domestic timber price ti is sunk at the
output stage, but for each unit of output in excess of xi the rm has to pay an additional
cost equal to t+ c. The cost-function is therefore piecewise linear, but globally convex,
and the cost parameter t > ti determines this convexity, for higher parameter-value t
increases the vertical segment of the marginal cost function.
Production Costs and Consumers in Domestic Market: The domestic rms
which produce non-tradable good qd have a similar cost functions as the exporting
rms. They incur a constant marginal cost ti for each unit of output produced with
domestic inputs. However, for timber importation they have to pay the price t of
imported timber. Since the market for non-tradable good is perfectly competitive, it
follows immediately that the price, r; for the nal good equals the timber price ti or t,
depending on the source of the input. Hence, the prot of these rms can be written
as
d = (rd   ti)qd
The consumersutility in domestic country depends on environmental quality of
12Cost parameter c reects the costs that are unrelated to the use of timber inputs, such as wages
and cost of capital.
13The existence of price agreement between rms and forest owners requires positive gains of trade.
This is ensured if the parameters satisfy s > bti    > 0:
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the domestic forests and consumption of good qd. For the sake of simplicity we assume
that this utility function is additively separable in its arguments, so that the expression
for the indirect utility function is
S(ti;m) = u[d(rd)]  rd(rd) + v (m) ;
where u[d(rd)] is he utility associated with consumption of qd; d(rd) denotes the demand
for the non-tradable good and v (m) is the social amenity valuation of forests left
standing by the forest owners. Without a loss of generality, we assume that social
amenity valuation is identical to that of the forest owners. The expressions satisfy the
following properties: u0[d(rd)] > 0 and u00[d(rd)]  0; and; d0(rd) < 0.14
The solution method of the model is that of backward induction: As a rst step,
we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium in prices for given xi and xj: Second, we
analyze rmschoice of timber inputs for given timber prices. The analysis of these last
two stages of the game is a direct application of the duopoly model presented in Maggi
(1996). The third step in the analysis examines the national timber markets and solves
for the equilibrium timber prices as determined in a bargaining process between forest
owners and the rms. Finally, we analyze the optimal forest conservation requirement.
3 Output Stage: Price Competition in the export-
market
At the nal stage of the game, each rm observes the outcome on the timber markets
in both producing countries. This involves the quantity of timber inputs, xi and xj,
acquired from the local forest owners. The quantity of timber inputs is thus a choice
of scale which determines the rmscost structures, and essentially, the conditions for
the price competition.
Given the rms cost-structure rm i chooses its price level, assuming that rm j
14Since the transactions between the rms and the forest owners incur within the economy and the
welfare e¤ects of forest conservation in the case of non-exporting rms are realized through perfectly
competitive markets, the focus of the analysis is predominantly on the rms in the export market.
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keeps its price xed. This program can be stated as
max
pi
i(pi; pj) =
8<: (pi   c)Qi(pi; pj) for Qi(pi; pj)  xi(pi   c  t)Qi(pi; pj)  (ti   t)xi for Qi(pi; pj)  xi; (3.1)
where Qi(pi; pj) = a  bpi + gpj (b > g > 0) denotes rm is linear demand.15
The following rst-order condition characterizes the solution to (3.1)
@i(pi; pj)
@pi
=
8<:  (pi   c)g +Qi(pi; pj) = 0 for Qi(pi; pj)  xi (pi   c  t)g +Qi(pi; pj) = 0 for Qi(pi; pj) > xi: (3.2)
Solving (3.2) for pi we obtain two functions demonstrating rm is price-responses
under two explicit cost structures:
r(pj; ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
ri (pj; c) =
a+ gpj
2b
+
c
2
for Qi(pi; pj)  xi
and
ri
 
pj; c+ t

=
a+ gpj
2b
+
c+ t
2
for Qi(pi; pj) > xi:
(3.3)
Function ri (pj; c) expresses a price-response function, when the rm i chooses to use
domestic timber only. If the rm i chooses to produce in excess of the predetermined
output capacity, the price-response is based on function ri(pj; c+ t).
To gain understanding on the timber acquisitionsrole as a capacity constraint in
price competition, we need to dene a third price-response function. This isoquantity
function determines the optimal price-combinations that satisfy xi = Qi(pi; pj). The
isoquantity function can be derived by substituting xi into (3.2) and solving for pi to
obtain:
i(pj; xi) =
a+ gpj   xi
b
for Qi(pi; pj) = xi: (3.4)
The following Result reproduces Lemma 1 in Maggi (1996) which characterizes rm is
15The linearity of demand and costs is not essential for the results, but simplies their presentation.
We consider the case of di¤erentiated products for two reasons. The rst reason is technical. If the
goods were considered homogeneous, the competition in the export market would resemble Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983). Development of such model in the presence of input markets would be di¢ cult
and complicate the exposition. Second, processed wood products, for instance ne paper, have several
di¤erent quality dimensions, hence, it is plausible to assume that the nal goods are di¤erentiated.
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subgame best-response function in price-space.
Result 1 For any arbitrary level xi, there exists a unique price-pair A = [piA; p
j
A] and
B = [piB; p
j
B]; where p
j
A < p
j
B; such that
ri(pjA; c) = 
i(pjA; x
i)
ri(pjB; t) = 
i(pjB; x
i):
Hence, the relevant branches of ri (pj; c), i(pj; xi) and ri(pj; c + t) constitute the
following subgame best-response function in price-space
Ri(pj; xi)
8>>><>>>:
= ri (pj; c) for pj < pjA
= i(pj; x) for pjA  pj  pjB
= ri(pj; c+ t) for pj > pjB:
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Figure 2: Decision in output space
In Figure 1, the bold line illustrates the best-response function for rm i. Given
xi = xi equilibrium of the game can be found at the point of intersection between
Ri(pj; xi) and Rj(pi; xj). The result is driven by the convexity of the marginal cost
function illustrated in Figure 2. For low levels of pj < pjA the optimal response coincides
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with the function ri(pj; c). The reason is that along this line rm i has enough timber
inputs to satisfy any demand level between the lines ri(pj; c) and (pj; xi). Hence, the
level of timber inputs is not binding constraint for rm i, and thus, the best response
is identical to the standard Bertrand response with marginal cost c.
For higher pj; the prices along the segment ri(pj; c) no longer constitute a feasible
strategies for rm i, because they imply Qi(pi; pj) > xi and a marginal cost c+ t. For
this region the best response thus must coincide with i(pj; xi): In Figure 2 this branch
is illustrated by the vertical segment of the marginal cost functionMC. As the vertical
segment increases, the marginal-cost of price-cutting (increasing production) increases
when producing at Qi(pi; pj) = xi. A higher t thus generates a disincentive to increase
output in excess of xi, and rm is price response coincides with (pj; xi). This e¤ect is,
however, o¤set for high enough pj: When pj > pjB; the marginal revenue of increasing
production, MR, is higher than marginal cost of increasing production beyond xi. It
then follows that the best response-function Ri(pj; xi) coincides with ri(pj; c + t) at
point [ri(pjB; c+ t); p
j
B].
These considerations indicate that an equilibriumwhich can be implemented through
rmspre-commitment to use domestic timber-inputs, lies between points A and B, in
the region between Bertrand reaction functions ri(pj; c) and ri(pjB; c + t). This region
entails the relevant points which constitute a strategically stable equilibrium of the full
game which will be analyzed below.
4 Timber Market: Capacity Decision and Timber
Price Bargaining
This section characterizes the equilibria of the full game between the rms. First,
assuming symmetric timber prices in each country, we solve for the equilibrium quan-
tity of domestic timber inputs used by the exporting rms. Second, after solving for
the optimal capacity levels in terms of timber inputs, we characterize the bargaining
problem in domestic timber markets, the solution of this problem then determines the
e¤ective timber prices.
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4.1 Demand for Domestic Timber
Following Maggi (1996), we solve for the symmetric equilibrium in timber-capacities xi
and xj in three steps. First, based on the best-response function described in Result
1, we determine the price-pairs which can be implemented through rmscapacity de-
cisions under di¤erent values of t. Second, given the set of equilibrium candidates, we
choose a strategically stable price equilibrium which implicitly determines the equilib-
rium levels of xi and xj. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium properties.
After timber price bargaining, rm i unilaterally chooses the amount of domestic
timber it will use in production at the following stage. This problem can be formalized
as follows
max
xi
i = (pi   c)Qi(pi; pj)  tixi (4.1)
s:t: pj = Rj(pi; xj)
Qf (pi; pj) = xf ; f = i; j (C1)
ri
 
pj; c
  pi  ri(pj; c+ t) s:t: t  tc (C2)
The key in understanding the problem is in the constraints illustrating the price-pairs
the rm i can implement through an appropriate level of xi.
The rst constraint in (4.1), pj = Rj(pi; xj), determines the price-pairs which can
be implemented in the proceeding price-subgame for given xj. This set is rened by the
second constraint (C1), implying that both rms always produce at capacity; hence,
the relevant price-pairs can be found on the isoquantity line j(pi; xj).16 Finally, the
constraint (C2) establishes a lower and an upper bound for these prices. These bounds
are determined by branches ri (pj; c) and ri(pj; c+ t) of Ri(pj; xi): The lower bound is
readily xed by the cost parameter c; but the region increases with higher levels of t.
However, there is an upper limit for prices which can be supported as an equilibrium.
That is, there is a unique parameter value t = tc and a corresponding symmetric price
pic = r
i(pjc; c+ t
c
), above which an increase in prices leads to reduction in prots.17
16For the proof of (C1), see the Appendix B.
17Note that ri(pjc; c+ t
c
) is linear and increasing in t: Furthermore, symmetric price pi = a=(b  g)
implies zero demand. Hence, there is t0 that satises ri(pj ; c + t0) = a=(b   g). By observation
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A combination of these constraints determines a condition which the equilibrium
price-pair must satisfy. Dene t as a region consisting of price-pairs that satisfy (C2)
for both rms. Furthermore, dene x
j
as the set of price-pairs which satisfy (C1) for
given xj; and note that these prices lie on the isoquantity function j(pi; xj). Using t
and x
j
we obtain a set of price-pairs which can be implemented by an appropriate
level of xi
t\xj : (C3)
In Figure 3, the bold lines illustrate the regiont and the bold section of the isoquantity
line j(pi; xj) illustrates the condition (C3).
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Having dened the condition the equilibrium price-pair must satisfy, we can de-
termine the symmetric and strategically stable equilibria under di¤erent parameter
values t.18 We begin the equilibrium analysis by examining the Cournot benchmark
in price-space under symmetric timber prices, i.e. ti = tj. Let ~i(r) denote the rm
is isoprot curve yielding prot equal to r; i.e. ~i(r) = fpi; pj  0; i(pi; pj) = rg.
Since i(pi; pj) is continuously di¤erentiable for Qi(pi; pj)  xi, the isoprot curve is
smooth and di¤erentiable. Because @i=@pj > 0, when neither rm prices itself out of
the market, an increase in pj shifts i(r) further away from the pi axis, yielding higher
@ri(pj ; c + t0)=@t < 1 we infer that there is tc < t0 and pic = r
i(pjc; c + t
c
) under which a further
increase in prices leads to reduction in prot as the rival can price the rm out of the market.
18Although the game allows for asymmetric outcomes, we focus on symmetric equilibria. Maggi
(1996) examines asymmetric equilibria in more detail. It should, however, be noted that the main
results remain unchanged in the case of asymmetric outcomes.
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prots for rm i. It then follows immediately, that when @pj@xi < 0 a reduction in xi
is a dominating strategy for rm i.
Consider then gure 3 and the Bertrand equilibrium at point B = (pi; pj). At
this point, the slope of i(r) equals rj(pi; c), and when Qf (pi; pj) = xf (f = i; j), the
isoquantity lines i(pj; xi) and j(pi; xj) trace through this point. By condition (C3)
rm i can thus implement any price-pair on the isoquantity line j(pi; xj) within the
region t. Since at point B the isoquantity line j(pi; xj) is steeper than rj(pi; c), a
reduction in xi shifts i(pj; xi) to left and implements a price-pair B0 = (pi0; pj0) on a
higher isoprot curve. This reects the fact that when a rm sets its quantity, the price
it can get for its products is increasing in rivals price. The shaded area in Figure 4
illustrates the set of feasible price-pairs which dominate the Bertrand equilibrium B.19
Given the value of xj, an optimal xi is the one that implements a price pair which is as
far away from the pi-axis as possible and still has at least one point in common with
the best response function Rj(pi; xj).
Consider then the pointC = (pic; p
j
c) at the intersection between the lines r
i(pj; c+tc)
and rj(pi; c+ tc) in Figure 4. This point represents a symmetric Cournot equilibrium.
The reason is that at any other point within the shaded area between points B and
C the rms have an incentive to reduce xf . The only price pair within this region,
in which neither rm can prot from a output reduction is point C; where the input
level xjc = Q
j(pic; p
j
c) is rm js best response to x
i
c = Q
i(pic; p
j
c).
20 Figure 5 shows that
at point C, the slope of rm is isoprot function coincides with j(pi; xjc) and neither
19That is, these points lie on a higher or on the same isoprot lines than point B.
20This is because within this region the slope of the rmsisoprot function is lower than that of
the rivals isoquantity function. Hence, the rms have an incentive to reduce x so as to implement a
price pair on a higher isoprot function.
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rm has an incentive to increase or reduce x.
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Figure 6 describes the equilibrium outcome under intermediate level of t. For
parameter values t < tc; the Cournot outcome cannot be sustained as an equilibrium,
because a lower cost of timber importation induces the rms to cut prices and increase
production. To illustrate this, suppose that t < tc and both rms set their quantity
of domestic timber inputs equal to xic. The point C; however, does not survive the
elimination of dominated strategies, because for given price pic and isoquantity line
i(pj; xic) the optimal response for rm j is p
j = rj(pic; c + t) < p
j
c. The reason is
that the marginal revenue from expanding the production outweighs rm js cost of
timber importation. Repeating this exercise for any other point between the points BC
and C readily implies that the only symmetric equilibrium surviving the elimination of
dominated strategies is at pointBC, where rm i produces a quantity xib = Q
i(pib; p
j
b) >
Qi(pic; p
j
c). In a similar manner as in the case of the Cournot equilibrium we can see
that at any point below BC on the diagonal, a dominating strategy involves an output
reduction. Hence, the symmetric equilibria under parameter values t < tc are located
at the intersection between lines ri(pj; c+ t) and rj(pi; c+ t).
The following result summarizes these ndings
Result 2 Suppose that timber prices are symmetric in producing countries. In equi-
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librium each exporting rm produces with domestic timber, i.e.
xf = Qf (pi; pj) f = i; j
and the symmetric price-equilibrium is determined by the cost of timber importation.
In particular, when timber importation is costly, i.e. t > tc > ti, the equilibrium prices
coincide with Cournot prices. For parameter values tc > t > ti, the equilibrium prices
coincide with Bertrand-prices with marginal cost c+ t. Formally:
Pb =

(pib; p
j
b) : p
i
b = r
i

rj(pib; c+ t); c+ t
	
for ti < t  tc; and
Pc =

(pic; p
j
c) : p
i
c = r
i

rj(pic; c+ t
c
); c+ t
c	
for t  tc:
The demand for domestic timber demand is (weakly) decreasing in t; but independent
of symmetric changes in ti and tj.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Result 2 establishes two equilibrium properties which are relevant to the analyses
of the timber market and the optimal forest conservation policy. First, the cost of
importing timber determines the price of the nal good in the export market. High unit
cost of timber importation increases the prices of the nal-goods, for it allows the rms
to credibly contract their output through the established a pre-commitment to lower
output capacity. A lower cost of timber importation, in turn, is conducive to tougher
price competition and higher output levels in the export-market, and consequently,
increases the demand for domestic timber.
Second, although domestic timber prices inuence the rmscost structures and
prots, their role in the export-market is relatively small. When t  tc domestic timber
prices do not inuence the equilibrium outcome of the game in price-space. This result
is robust to symmetric and asymmetric changes in ti and tj, but for parameter values
t > t
c the impact of an asymmetric change in ti requires more detailed comparative
statics. This issue will be examined in the following subsection.
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4.2 Timber Price Bargaining
In most large wood producing countries, buyers can employ monopsony power in the
timber price negotiations with the forest owners.21 Hence, the degree of competition on
timber market depends on the forest ownersbargaining power on the other side of the
market.22 A convenient way to capture the potential imperfections in timber market
is to assume that the price is determined through a Nash-bargaining process between
the rm and forest owners, subject to the constraint that domestic rm unilaterally
decides upon the use of timber. In modeling the bargaining process, we assume that
the rms producing the non-tradable good are price takers and the market price is
determined by the negotiations between the exporting rm and the forest owners.23
In each country the rm and the forest owners rst observe the available harvest
of a representative forest owner x  M   m. The bargainers then agree on timber
prices and the market clears so that each forest owner in the market sells her harvest
to rm i or to other companies in the forest sector. We restrict the bargainers to
condition the prices on the actual harvest and output decisions of rm i.24 Firm i
cannot condition timber prices on the elasticity-factor describing the extent to which
timber price inuences the outcome of the game in the export-market.25
In the case of disagreement, forest ownersutility coincides with the reservation
utility U0(0) = v(M). The target function of a representative forest owner thus be-
comes eU(ti) = U(ti; x)   U0(0) = ti   bti(m)x; where x = M   m. Since the
output of rm i is determined by t and the quantity of timber traded in the domestic
market is unilaterally decided by rm i, the target functions of the forest owners can
21For empirical evidence on oligopsony power on timber market see, e.g. Bergman and Brännlund
(1995).
22In Finland the practice of price agreements, for timber sales was common in the 1990s. The
agreements were an outcome of a collective bargaining process that determined annual price recom-
mendations for forest owners.
23This can be justied by the notion that since the prot tend to zero in domestic market under
perfect competition, these rms have reduced incentives to engage in timber price negotiations.
24See, e.g. Kuhn (1997).
25The reason for this assumption is intuitive. Although lower timber prices might induce an expan-
sion in the total demand of domestic timber, this output e¤ect does not carry over to individual forest
owners welfare, as her timber supply is limited to x.
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be combined to obtain the following collective target function
eU(ti) =
8<:

ti   bti(m)xib(t) for t  tc
ti   bti(m)xic(tc) for t  tc;
where xib(t) = Q
i(pib; p
j
b) and x
i
c(t
c
) = Qi(pic; p
j
c) denotes the xed demand of timber
inputs determined by the cost parameter t.
Firm is target function is ei = i i; where i represents a disagreement point at
which the rm withdraws from negotiations and shifts to importation. For parameter
range t > tc the threat point is at tc, because for tc < ti the costs become too high and
the rm will price itself out of the market. Hence, by (3.1) the rm is target function
becomes
ei(ti) =
8<: (t  ti)xib(t) for t  t
c
(t
c   ti)xic(tc) for t  tc;
where 0    1 reects the bargaining power of the forest owners.
In accord with Nash (1950), the bargaining problem can be stated as
max
ti2[bti;t] 
(ti) = eU(ti)ei(ti)1 
s:t: xi = xi(t)
Solving the rst-order condition for ti yields
tis =
8<: t+ (1  )bti(m) for t  t
c
;
t
c
+ (1  )bti(m) for t > tc; (4.2)
Proposition 1 characterizes this solution.
Proposition 1 When forest owners reservation price is lower than the cost timber
importation, i.e. bti < t, the rm and forest owners reach an agreement on timber
price. The agreement has the following properties:
(i) Lower parameter value t depresses domestic timber prices and reduces the indi-
vidual forest owners harvest revenue.
(ii) Tighter conservation requirement reduces the forest owners harvest revenue and
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increases the domestic timber price.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the observation that @tis=@m = (1  
)

@bti(m)=@m  0 and @tis=@t =   0:
The solution to the bargaining problem determines the division of rent generated
by the di¤erence between the admissible timber prices and cost of timber importation.
The intuition is as follows. Result 2 readily shows that for tis  t timber demand is
xed and determined by t. Furthermore, the bargainers cannot condition timber prices
on the output decision of the outside rm, indicating that a lower value of t decreases
the rent and imposes downward pressure on timber prices. Raising conservation re-
quirement, in turn, increases the forest owners reservation price and timber prices.
Both of these e¤ects tend to reduce forest ownersharvest revenue by decreasing the
di¤erence between the highest and the lowest admissible timber price, respectively.
As is usual in bargaining situations, the extent to which the outside options of
the bargainers a¤ect the outcome depends on their bargaining power. If the forest
ownersbargaining power is high (i.e.  ! 1), they capture the entire rent generated
by the lower price of domestic inputs, i.e. tis = t > bti. In this case raising conservation
requirement has no e¤ect on timber prices, because a further increase in timber price
would induce rm i to shift to importation and the deal becomes unfeasible. By similar
lines of reasoning it is easy to see that a reduction in t passes through to timber price
in full.
When the rm has all the bargaining power, the timber price coincides with the
reservation price. Hence, a lower importation costs does not inuence the timber price
as the deal becomes unfeasible from the forest ownersviewpoint. Furthermore, the
e¤ect of raising conservation requirement pass to timber price level in full as the change
in timber price equals the loss in forest ownerstimber revenue.
Before turning to conservation issues it useful to discuss the implications of con-
servation on rmsuse of domestic timber. To this end, consider an increase in forest
conservation levelm: This increases timber prices by @tis=@ m and the e¤ects on industry
equilibrium are as follows:
Result 3 When the cost of importation is low, a raise in the conservation requirement
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has no e¤ect on rmstimber demand. Under high t, tighter conservation requirement
in country i increases rm js use of timber inputs and output. This e¤ect reduces rm
is prot, timber demand and hence, its market share:
di
dti
=  xib
dtis
dm
for tis < t  tc
di
dtis
=
di
dxjb
dxjb
dtis
  xib
dtis
dm
< 0 for t  tc > tis;
where
di
dxjb
dxjb
dtis
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The rst part of Result 3 follows immediately from Result 2, which established that
asymmetric changes in timber prices do a¤ect the export market equilibrium, when
tis < t < t
c. However, an increase in timber price induces an asymmetric change in the
competition environment and a¤ects the equilibrium, when the capacity constraint is
rigid. The intuition is the following. Higher timber price increases rm is marginal cost
of production. As in standard Cournot-game, a higher marginal cost of production,
c+ tis induces rm j to increase its capacity. Firm i anticipates this and is induced to
reduce its capacity to counter the downward pressure on prices and prot. Therefore,
raising conservation requirement applied to domestic forest means that the rm is
output is in the export market becomes replaced by that of the rm j.
5 Optimal Forest Conservation Policy
Proposition 1 and Result 3 characterize the behavioral constraints the regulator faces
in the design for optimal conservation policy. The constraints illustrate how an asym-
metric changes in the conservation requirements inuence the market outcomes in both
domestic timber markets and the export market for nal goods. These results consti-
tute the behavioral constraints in the design for optimal conservation policy in the
exporting countries.
Regulator of country i chooses m to maximize welfare. By choice of units, we set
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the total population of country i equal to one and let ni < 1 denote the proportion of
forest owners. Hence, the regulators program can be written as
max
m
Gi = niU [x(ti)] + i(pi; pj; ti) + d(rd; ti) + (1  ni)S(ti;m) s:t: (5.1)
ti = tis; (BC1)
dxj
dtis
dtis
dm
= 0 for t < t
c
;
dxj
dtis
dtis
dm
> 0 for t  tc (BC2)
where expressions (BC1) and (BC2) restate the behavioral constraints of Proposition 1
and Result 3. Constraint (BC1) expresses the e¤ect of policy decision on timber prices.
Constraint (BC2) describes the e¤ects of conservation policy on the equilibrium in the
export-market.
The welfare-analysis is in three steps. First, we provide a general rst-order con-
dition characterizing the solution to (5.1). Using this condition, we determine the
rst-best policy. Finally, we examine the implications of the behavioral constraints on
the optimal policy decision and examine circumstances which give a raise to policy
distortions from the rst-best.
The rst-order condition for a solution to problem (5.1) is
@Gi(m)
@m
= ni

 tis +
@v(m)
@m
+
@ti
@m
x

+
@i
@m
+ (1  ni)@S(t
i;m)
@m
= 0: (5.2)
Observe that the e¤ect of higher timber prices on domestic timber market and on
the domestic market for non-tradable goods are transactions within the economy.26
Therefore, we can rearrange the above expression to obtain
@Gi(m)
@m
=  nitis +
@Qi(pi; pj)
@m
(pi   c) + (1  ni)@S(t
i;m)
@m
= 0
Using (5.2) we obtain a term i which can be used to relate the optimal policies
26That is,
@(nitix)
@m
=
@[tiQi(pi; pj) + tiqd]
@m
and
@[d(rd)rd]
@m
=
@(rdqd)
@m
:
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to the rst-best:
i =
@u[d(rd)]
@d(rd)
@d(rd)
@rd
@rd
@m
+
@v(m)
@m
  nitis (5.3)
In the present model the denition of the usual rst-best rule in environmental eco-
nomics is as follows: The marginal social benet of forest conservation, @v(m)=@m;
equals the combined economic loss in terms of reduction in harvesting,  nitis and the
loss in consumer surplus in the market for non-tradable goods. Formally, the rst-
best policy implies i = 0. Since v(m) is strictly concave in m; a policy scheme with
i > 0 indicates a policy distortion from the rst-best as it entails lower conservation
requirement than warranted by the marginal social benet of forest conservation. A
similar reasoning indicates that when i < 0, the harvesting constraint is tighter than
the rst-best.
The conservation policy inuences the distribution of rent within the forest sector,
because it a¤ects the division of surplus between the rms and forest owners in the
form of higher timber prices.27 This e¤ect, however, occurs within the economy and
should not exert distortions on the conservation policy. It then follows that a potential
policy-distortion must be driven by the reasons related to the rmscompetitiveness,
which are treated in more detail in results 2 and 3. Proposition 2 examines the policy
implications of these results:
Proposition 2 Optimal policy applies rst-best harvesting constraints to forest own-
ers, unless the cost of importing timber inputs is high enough. Specically,
(i) For low cost of timber importation, ti < t < tc; optimal policy coincides with the
rst-best.
(ii) For high cost level, t > tc; optimal policy is lower than the rst-best.
Proof. A full description of optimal policies is in Appendix C.
Recall that Result 2 indicated that when the cost of timber importation is su¢ -
ciently low, the market equilibrium is determined by cost parameter t and asymmetric
changes in domestic timber prices do not a¤ect the equilibrium. Result 3, in turn, shows
27Observe that for  = 0 term U(x) = v(M); hence, conservation policy does not inuence forest
ownerswelfare. A similar line of reasoning applies to case  = 1: In such case @=@m = 0:
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that in Cournot equilibrium a small asymmetric change in domestic timber price in-
duces a reduction in domestic rmsmarket share, indicating that around symmetric
equilibrium a small reduction in the rst-best conservation requirement increases the
income of domestic country.28
The implications on the optimal conservation policy can be understood intuitively as
follows. Although the wood processing industry does not engage in timber importation,
the mere opportunity for this inuences the market outcome and may allow for the
design for a rst-best forest conservation policy. This is because when imported timber
is more a¤ordable, domestic forest resources becomes a less important factor in the
competition for international market-shares. As domestic timber prices do not a¤ect
the international market for processed wood-products, the opportunity cost of forest
conservation becomes lower. As a result, the regulator can increase the conservation
requirements and implement a rst-best conservation program.29
When the cost of timber importation is high enough so that importation is an
unfeasible option for the rms, the price of domestic timber essentially determines
the competitive environment in the export market. The opportunity cost of forest
conservation becomes thus higher as it a¤ects the domestic income not only through
higher timber prices, but also by diminishing domestic prot in the export market.
Anticipating this, a welfare maximizing regulator is induced to apply lower harvesting
constraints to the forest owners so as to increase the domestic income.
6 Conclusion
This paper examined optimal forest conservation policy and international trade in forest
products with an attention to country-specic timber markets and timber importation.
The analysis demonstrates that when timber importation is costly, the rms can es-
tablish a credible pre-commitment to use less domestic timber inputs to sustain higher
prices in the export-market. The commitment device is especially e¤ective, when the
28A small change in timber price refers to a change that does not change the set of relevant equilibria.
That is, the ex-post timber price satises ti < t.
29In particular, in the present model a rst-best conservation requirement constitutes an optimal
policy insofar as domestic forest owners survive on the market for industrial roundwood, i.e. t^( m) 
t < t
c.
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unit cost of timber imports is high enough, so that the market-outcome coincides with
that of Cournot competition. However, when the cost of timber imports becomes lower,
the competition on the export market becomes tougher and the prices coincide with
a Bertrand benchmark. Tougher competition in export-market also adds downward
pressure on prices in local timber markets, because the outside option for the rms in
the form of timber importation becomes more a¤ordable.
The welfare analysis of forest conservation and the policy propositions therein in-
troduce qualications to the ndings in the literature on environmental policy and in-
ternational trade. Although the game allows for the Cournot and Bertrand outcomes,
the optimal policy exhibits distortions in a rather limited circumstances. Namely, it is
optimal to apply ine¢ ciently low harvesting constraint to forest owners, when the price
imported timber is high. However, when timber importation becomes less costly, the
optimal policy coincides with the rst-best. This result undermines the usual nding
that under oligopoly-competition the optimal policy decision is sensitive to assumptions
about the mode of competition.
The result can be understood intuitively as follows. When the cost of timber im-
portation is high, the competitive environment of the exporting rms is determined by
the cost of producing with domestic timber. Under these circumstances forest conser-
vation and the resulting increase in timber prices involves a cost in the form of lower
domestic income due to reduced market share in the export market. This e¤ect is less
pronounced when the price of imported timber is low. The reason is that the rms
behavior in the export market is guided by the cost of timber importation. As a result,
conservation policy and its e¤ect on timber prices does not play a role in the export
market, allowing the government to raise the conservation requirements with lower
opportunity cost.
Appendix A
Proof of (2.3). Reservation price t^ satises U(x)jti=bti = U(0): Where x =
argmaxU(x). The rst property of (2.3) implies that under binding harvesting con-
straint x = M   m: It can be shown that for su¢ ciently high G any constraint
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satisfying m > 0 is binding. Hence, di¤erentiating U(x)jti=bti = U(0) with respect to
m we obtain dbt=dm = [ti   v0(m)]=(M   m)  0. Under binding constraint, forest
ownersharvesting decision can be formalized into following Lagrangian:
L(x; ) = btx+ v(m) + (M  m  x):
The rst-order conditions are
@L(x; )
@x
= bt  v0(m)   = 0
@L(x; )
@
= M  m  x = 0:
This implies that [ti   v0(m)] =  > 0; hence dbt=dm > 0:
Appendix B
Proof of Result 1. Consider rm is optimal response in price and output space
as depicted in Figures 1 and Figure 2, respectively. Keeping xi xed at, say xi; rm i
chooses price level to maximize prots. Given pj and cost parameters ti and t; prot
maximization amounts to picking a price level pi such that marginal cost of price-
cutting, MC; equals rm is marginal revenue of increasing production, MR.
Suppose, rst that pj = pjl < p
j
A; hence r
i(pjl ; c) > 
i(pjl ; x
i). This implies that MR
crosses MC before xi and therefore ri(pjl ; c) is the optimal reply, for r
i(pjl ; c) implies
Qi[ri(pjl ; c); p
j
l ] < x
i: Then let pj = pjm 2 [pjA; pjB]: This implies thatMR crossesMC at
its vertical segment and xi is the optimal output. Hence, optimal reply is i(pjm; x
i) that
satises ri(pjm; c) < 
i(pjm; x
i) < i(pjm; c+ t): Finally, suppose that p
j = pjh  pjB: This
implies that i(pjh; x
i) > ri(pjh; c+ t) and MR crosses MC at c+ t; thus optimal reply
coincides with ri(pjh; c+ t):
Proof of Constraints (C1) and (C2). Constraint (C1) ensures that rm i
always produces at capacity, xi = Q(pi; pj): By contradiction, consider an equilibrium
price-pair Po = (pio; p
j
o) and capacity level x
i that satises xi > Qi(pio; p
j
o). Thus, rm
i can reduce its costs by using less timber inputs. This implies that optimal capacity
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xio satises 
i(pjo; x
i
o) = r
i(pjo; c), and x
i
o = Q
i(pio; p
j
o).
Similar logic applies if xi < Qi(piu; p
j
u): By Result 1, price-pair P
u = (piu; p
j
u) lies
on the segment ri(pj; c+ t) on Ri(pj; xi). Hence, rm i can reduce its costs by substi-
tuting timber imports by domestic inputs. This increases prot without a¤ecting the
equilibrium prices. It follows that N ix  Qi(pi; pj) : pi; pj 2 t optimal xi satises
xi = Q(pi; pj).
Constraint (C2) implies that the set of feasible prices for rm i is determined by
t, and the upper bound for these prices is:
pi; pj : ri(pj; c+ t) = rj(pi; c+ t) for t < t
c
pic; p
j
c : r
i(pjc; c+ t
c
) = rj(pic; c+ t
c
) for t  tc:
To show that prices pi > pic are not feasible we will establish that there exists a price-
pair (pic; p
j
c) that lies in the intersection between r
i(pj; c+ t
c
) and rj(pi; c+ tc), so that a
symmetric price increase generated by higher t induces a reduction in rmsprot. To
see this note that for a symmetric price p0 = a=(b  g) it holds that Qi(p0; p0). Using
function ri(pj; c+ tc) we can solve for a parameter value t0 generating this symmetric
price, t0 = a=(b   g)   c. Next, observe that @ri(pj; c + t)=@t = 1
2
. Hence, given that
pi   t  c > 0 for t < t0; there must be a unique tc st.
@Qi[ri(pj; c+ t); rj(pi; c+ t)]
@t
 0 for t  tc
@Qi[ri(pj; c+ t); rj(pi; c+ t)]
@t
 0 for t  tc:
Price pic = r
i(pjc; c+ t
c
) is thus the highest feasible price under parameter values t  tc.
Proof of Result 2. First, observe that 0 < @rj(pi; c+ t)=@pi < @j(pi; xj)=@pi <
1: Then, dene a region t
c
and a unique xj = xjc; for which r
i(pi; c + tc) traces
through a point, Pc = (pic; p
j
c) (on the diagonal), at this point the slope of rm is
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isoprot function i equals j(pi; xjc). P
c is illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 7: Parameter tc
First , consider the case t < tc. To verify that Pb = (pib; p
j
b) constitutes a stable
equilibrium of the full game, we need show that when xj = Qj(pib; p
j
b); optimal x
i for
rm i is xib = Q
i(pib; p
j
b). Note that for given x
j
b, symmetric pair P
b is the highest point
that satises (C2), and t < tc implies that point Pb lies lower on the diagonal than
Pc. Hence, the slope of j(pi; xjb) is higher than that of the highest isoprot function,
ensuring that xib = Q
i(pib; p
j
b) is optimal capacity level for rm i. By symmetry, this is
the unique symmetric equilibrium.
To show that Pc = (pic; p
j
c); is the unique equilibrium when t  tc, we need to check
that for xj = Qj(pic; p
j
c) rm is optimal choice is x
i = Qi(pic; p
j
c). Firm i observes that
for suitable xi it may implement any price-pair that satisfy (C3). For xj = xjc and
t  tc; the highest admissible price-pair is Pc. By denition of tc; price-pair Pc yields
highest prot for i; hence, optimal xi is such that i(pj; xjc) intersects 
j(pi; xjc) at point
Pc: Symmetry implies that (xic; x
j
c) is unique equilibrium.
The proof of the result that timber demand is weakly decreasing t and independent
of ti follows immediately from constraint (C1).
Proof of Result 3. The proof amounts to checking whether an asymmetric
change in ti inuences the equilibrium outcome of the game played by the rms in the
export-market. Result 2 establishes that when t  tc; regardless of parameter values
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ti < t, a small change in ti does not inuence the outcome of the game, because the
symmetric equilibrium is determined by the best-response functions ri(pj; c + t) and
ri(pj; c+ t). Hence, we focus on the case t  tc.
For t > tc the equilibrium output is given by Qi(pic; p
j
c); where (p
i
c; p
j
c) lies at the
intersection between functions i(pj; xic) and 
j(pi; xjc). To illustrate the Cournot con-
jectures in price-space consider rm is optimal xi for any given xj. That is, rm i
chooses its capacity such that i(pj; xi) traces through the point of tangency between
the highest isoprot function and j(pi; xj). These points constitute the following con-
tinuous line in price space
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Figure 7: Cournot equilibria in price space Figure 8: Asymmetric change in ti
Figure 7 illustrates the line that depicts the potential Cournot equilibria under di¤erent
xj. A closed form expression for this line is
Ci(pj; xj; ti) =
1
2b2   g2

bgpj + ab+ (c+ ti)(b2   g2) ; (6.1)
The e¤ect of an asymmetric increase in ti is depicted in Figure 8 in which the higher ti
shifts Ci(pj; xj; ti) further away from pj axis which reduces rm is prot. Using (6.1)
this be formalized as follows
dCi(pj; xj; ti)
dti
=
(b2   g2)
2b2   g2 > 0;
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and for rm j
dCj(pi; xi; tj)
dm
=
bg
2b2   g2
dpi
dti
=
bg
2b2   g2
(b2   g2)
2b2   g2
@ti
@m
> 0
where gb=(2b2 g2) < 1. Hence, a raise in ti increases the prices of each rm. Property
[dCj(pi; xi; tj)=dti] < [dCi(pj; xj; ti)=dm] and equilibrium condition (C1) imply that
@Qi(pic; p
j
c)=@t
i  (@xic=@ti) < 0 and @Qj(pic; pjc)=@ti  (@xjc=@ti) > 0. Thus, the output
of the rm i (j) decreases (increases) as ti increases. Proposition 1 and the observation
that in Cournot equilibrium an increase in the rm js output reduces rm is prot
thus indicate that higher conservation requirement reduces the output and prot for
rm i:
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 2. For expositional purposes we use the following notation:
when N ix  Q(pib; pjb)  N jx the share of landowners in country i (j) is denoted by
L (S).
The proof is in three parts. We show that: (i) when t < t < tc the regulator
has no incentives to distort the policy from the rst-best level; (ii) for t < t < tc
optimal policy imposes i > 0; if Qi(pib; p
j
b)  N ix; and (iii) when t  tc optimal
policy satises i > 0.
(i) Result 2 and Lemma 1 imply that for ti < t < t conservation requirement
is not relevant to the equilibrium outcome of the game. The reason is that for these
parameter-values dxi=dm = 0: The remainder of the proof thus focuses on the two
relevant cases:
(ii) If (N i; N j) = (S; S) a marginal change inm does not inuence equilibrium price-
pair, for both rms are importing timber, hence @xi=@xj = 0:When (N i; N j) = (L; S);
if t < t < tc; equilibrium property pi =2 t \ xjc ensures that change in m has no
impact on xi; as it only increases rm is costs without a¤ecting the price equilibrium..
Under asymmetric supply shortages, (N i; N j) = (S; L) and t < t < tc; absent
binding harvesting constraints the equilibrium price lies at the intersection between
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i(pj; xic) and 
j(pi; xj)
30 along ri(pj; c + t). It is straightforward to see that tighter
harvesting constraints imply a further reduction in the available forest stock in country
1: This shifts the intersection between i(pj; xi) and ri(pj; c + t) toward rm js most
preferred point, which is the intersection between 	j(pi; t) and ri(pj; c + t). That is,
rm j expands its output to implement a price-pair that lies closer to 	j(pi; t) shifting
the market share away from rm i. Therefore, we conclude that
i =  (pi   c  t)@Q
i(pi; pj)
@pj
@pj
@xj
@xj
@m
> 0 for t

< t < t
c
; (N i; N j) = (S; L):
(c) Using Lemma 1, we obtain
@i(pic; p
j
c)
@m
=

@i(pic; p
j
c)
@xj
@xj
@tis
  xi

@tis
@m
:
Keeping in mind that xi
@ti
@m
= nix
@ti
@m
this indicates that
i =  @
i(pic; p
j
c)
@xj
@xj
@tis
@tis
@m
> 0 for t > t
c
:
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Essay III: Harmonization Versus Mutual
Recognition of National Eco-labels
Abstract
This paper formalizes a welfare-comparison between two international eco-
labeling schemes: harmonization and mutual recognition. The model involves
two countries. In each country there are two incumbent rms and a number of
potential entrants producing for domestic and export markets. In an asymmetric
information-environment, where the goodsenvironmental attributes are unob-
servable, rms with di¤erent labeling standards cannot implement a separating
equilibrium through price signaling. The di¤erence between the standards gen-
erates an information-rent in the export market increasing the number of active
rms with a labeling program applying lower standards to producers. Intensied
price competition improves the aggregate product quality in the markets and this
pro-competitive spillover of lower market transparency thus implies that mutual
recognition is welfare superior to harmonization, insofar as the di¤erence between
the standards is relatively low.
Keywords: Labeling, Environmental-quality uncertainty, duopoly signaling
JEL Classication: C72, L15, F18
1 Introduction
Eco-labeling has become a standard practice in most countries (Vossenaar 1997). These
programs are designed by an independent intermediary, which imposes and monitors
certain criteria that producers must meet in order to receive a certication for their
environmental performance.1 A market-based reason for the existence of eco-labels is
1Economic studies argue that third-party labeling performs better than industry-led programs in
correcting for the problem of asymmetric information between producers and consumers. See, e.g.
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their role as a signal of higher environmental quality which might not be fully assessed
on behalf of the customers with a willingness to pay for the productsenvironmental
attributes. In theory, labeling therefore constitutes an e¢ cient, non-mandatory, in-
strument of environmental policy. However, while the positive environmental benets
of credible eco-labeling are clear, some argue that these programs have become an im-
portant factor in market access generating pressures for the producers to apply for a
label. This has contributed to a several trade-disputes as national eco-labeling schemes
are often perceived to discriminate against outside producers generating distortional
e¤ects on trade, and fueled public debate about an appropriate level of di¤erentiation
between regional labeling standards in the global markets.2
There are two suggested remedies for the problem of multiple country-specic labels.
Harmonization of labeling standards has certain benets as it helps the exporters sell
their products without having to comply with di¤erent regulations in each country.
Harmonization also increases market transparency by ensuring the consumers that
imported goods comply with the same standards. The second remedy is the mutual
recognition of existing labeling schemes. This means that if a product is eligible for
a label granted by a national labeling program, it would automatically receive an
equal treatment with any other label in the importing countries. Mutual recognition
is arguably more exible from the viewpoint of the producing countries for it allows
them for more leverage to consider the national characteristics in the design of labeling
standards.3
The economic trade-o¤ between these policy schemes is linked to an old issue in
competition policy debate; namely, market transparency. Less transparency on the
consumer side, so consumers are uninformed about the product characteristics, usually
diminishes the producersincentives for product di¤erentiation (see e.g. Bester 1998
Kirchho¤ (2000) and Cason and Gangadharan (2002).
2For example, Germany requires companies not participating in its Green Dot scheme to take back
their packaging and bear the cost of recycling themselves. The cost is naturally greater for foreign
companies, which therefore have claimed that the for Green Dot label places imported goods at a
market disadvantage.
3It is implausible to presume that countries have identical environmental characteristics or social
preferences on which the labeling standards should be based. For instance, Scandinavian countries
and Canada are by far more sensitive to acid rain generated by the release of oxides of nitrogen (NOx)
and sulphur dioxide (SO2) than countries in Central Europe and US.
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and Akerlof 1970). The transparency problem arises under mutual recognition as goods
with higher environmental standards might not survive the competition in the markets.4
To prevent the collapse of markets for goods with high environmental quality, it seems
therefore plausible to think that the optimal coordination of ecolabeling schemes calls
for harmonization.
This paper presents the idea that despite the potential lack of market transparency,
the mutual recognition of labeling standards in the international markets could be wel-
fare superior to harmonized labeling standards. In a specic example involving verti-
cally di¤erentiated industry and an economy in which consumers cannot fully observe
the environmental quality of the products, this means that a small market failure gen-
erated by the lack of market transparency induces more producers to apply for a label.
The positive welfare e¤ect of mutual recognition is that tougher competition between
producers makes the labeled goods more a¤ordable to consumers which improves the
quality allocation in the market.
Essentially, the model combines several features in the literature on industrial or-
ganization, signaling games and international trade. The analysis derives the main
contributions of this paper in three steps. The rst step derives a benchmark involving
closed markets and full information. The market is segmented by consumer types with
di¤erent willingness to pay for the productsenvironmental quality and a price com-
petition between rms induces a market outcome involving di¤erent qualities.5 The
second step introduces asymmetric information to the model. This reects the usual
property that sellers are often better informed about the production related environ-
4A dispute, which is at least partly driven by this trade-o¤, is between the dominant forest cer-
ticates in Europe, Pan European Forest Certicate (PEFC) and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).
Each side has a strong nationally divided group of representatives. For instance, most Finnish forest
owners are certied by PEFC while the Swedish forests belong dominantly to FSC program. The rep-
resentatives of PEFC argue that FSC requirements do not consider the regional di¤erences between
forestsecological characteristics and the ownership structure. PEFC thus claims that both certicates
should be treated equally as there is only minor di¤erences between the actual requirements. However,
FSC and some environmental organizations argue that any labeling program, which does not meet
FSC standards, is insu¢ cient to guarantee environmentally sound forest management and consumers
should question the environmental attributes of PEFC-labeled products. See, e.g. "Anything Goes"
(2001) by Greenpeace and The Finnish Nature League.
5See e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995). More recently, Cremer and Thisse (1999) employed
a similar vertical product di¤erentiation framework and show that environmental quality competi-
tion improves the overall quality on the market, but in the absence of government intervention the
equilibrium fails to satisfy the criteria for Pareto-e¢ ciency.
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mental attributes of the goods than consumers; hence, the extent to which they can
capitalize on the consumerswillingness to pay depends on their ability to signal the
improvements in their environmental performance to consumers.6
The examination of the signaling game shows that they cannot implement a separat-
ing equilibrium, in which consumers observe the di¤erences between the environmental
qualities in the market. This results in a collapse of markets for goods with high en-
vironmental quality, unless there is a labeling program monitored by an independent
third party.7 Labeling enhances the quality distribution in the market, but the market
outcome fails to implement a Pareto e¢ cient allocation of environmental quality. This
is because in a closed economy a labeling program does not provide incentives for new
producers to enter the market, leaving the incumbent rms with market power which
they can employ to price discriminate the consumers.
The analysis of the signaling game in a single market serves as building block for the
third step of the analysis which considers two countries with two rms producing for the
domestic and a third country export market. Within this framework the analysis shows
that under mutual recognition between country specic labels, the signaling problem
carries over to the export market: When the export market consists of producers
with di¤erent labeling standards, the ones with higher standards cannot implement
a separating equilibrium. This generates an information rent for the producers with
lower labeling standards which, in turn, induces more producers to apply for this label.
Tougher competition in the market for labeled goods depresses prices and thereby
increases the market e¢ ciency making the higher environmental quality more a¤ordable
to consumers. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes between harmonized labels and
mutually recognized labels, the analysis shows that a market failure in the form of
lower market transparency might have a pro-competitive spillover, implementing an
equilibrium which Pareto dominates harmonization.
6In a seminal article Akerlof (1970) established that under asymmetric information markets are
ine¤ective in providing quality and only goods with lowest quality are sold to the market.
7There is a number of studies on asymmetric information and quality-signaling, but the most
severe problem, namely, the case of goodscredence attributes has deserved less attention (see e.g.
Shapiro 1982). This problem is particularly relevant for most internationally traded goods with
production related environmental externalities, since the consumers may have diminished ability to
learn the goodsenvironmental quality, because of the physical distance between the production and
consumption sites.
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Market transparency, product di¤erentiation, eco-labeling and the signaling prob-
lem have been touched upon before in the economic literature. However, the analysis of
the international dimensions of labeling and transparency in the presence of credence
attributes has not been conclusive. Most of the literature on quality signaling examines
the interaction between one rm and consumers, abstracting from signaling between
competing senders.8 The literature on oligopoly-signaling focuses on cost-signaling be-
tween competing rms and, as in the present study, quality-signaling between rms and
consumers.9 Included among these are Herzendorf and Overgaard (2000); Herzendorf
and Overgaard (2001) and Fluet and Garella (2002), which examine price signaling
behavior when the rms do not have an established reputation.10
Kirchho¤(2000) examines the role of third-party labels in producersenvironmental
quality decision, when monopolist can build reputations and the qualities are revealed
with a certain probability. The results establish that third-party labeling increases
the likelihood that compliance to voluntary environmental standards is protable for a
monopolist. For the general case of labeling standards and trade, Jansen and Lincé de
Faria (2002) compared mutual recognition and harmonization for two countries with
di¤erent consumer preferences and cost di¤erences. The study showed that harmoniza-
tion, in most cases, leads to a better welfare outcome than mutual recognition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the
assumptions of the model. Section three establishes the criteria for welfare optimal
distribution of environmental quality, and examines rmsquality decisions under full
information and autarky. Section four analyzes the signaling game under asymmet-
ric information, and compares the results with full information and Pareto e¢ cient
benchmarks. Section ve analyzes how third-party labeling inuences the industry-
equilibrium in domestic and foreign markets. Conclusions follow.
8For instance Milgrom and Roberts (1986) examine the price and advertising signaling in monopoly.
9For information on signaling as a mechanism to deter entry, see, e.g. Bagwell and Ramey (1991).
10Herzendorf and Overgaard (2001) and Fluet and Garella (2002) also allow for advertising signals.
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2 The Model
We consider a partial equilibrium model, in which good x is produced in two countries,
domestic and foreign. When needed, subscripts, d and f , are used as a mnemonic for
domestic and foreign country. In each country there are two incumbent rms and n
potential entrants. The incumbent rms are denoted by superscripts 1 and 2; and the
entrants are denoted by superscript N = (3; 4; :::; n). The rms produce good x for
domestic and world market. The remaining assumptions of the model are comparable
to the ones used in the literature on vertical product di¤erentiation:
1. Abatement: Production of x generates an environmental externality (emis-
sions), e = (e   a); where e denotes laizzes faire emission level, and a 2 (a; a)
denotes the abatement level; where a > 0 is the minimum abatement require-
ment for an active rm. Abatement level a denotes the most e¢ cient, technically
feasible, abatement level.
2. Production costs: For each active rm, a short-term cost function takes the
form C(a) > 0 8a > a and C(a) = 0 otherwise. The cost is constant in quantity,
but convex in abatement: C 0(a) > 0 and C 00(a) > 0: In addition, each rm which
upgrades its technology from, say ai to aj; and wishes to inform the consumers
about it, incurs a xed set-up and advertisement cost, j(aj) = , before the
production stage. The cost satises,
C(aj)  C(ai)  j(aj) for any aj > ai  a (1)
reecting that the marginal cost of producing higher quality is higher than the
set-up and advertisement cost per unit of production. The incumbent rms have
an initial abatement technology a. Hence, they may produce with minimum
quality level without an additional cost. A representative entrant has an initial
abatement level aN = 0. Entry thus requires an upgrade to a and a cost equal to
N(a) = .11
11Condition (1) thus states that  is small enough to ensure non-negative payo¤ for the entrant
that chooses quality ai, provided that the rival rmsquality is higher and there is positive demand
for the product variety.
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3. Preferences and asymmetric information: The description of consumer pref-
erences is a version of Mussa and Rosen (1978). In each country there is a con-
tinuum of consumers uniformly distributed and ranked in the same interval in
decreasing order of their intensity of preferences for goodsenvironmental quality
 2 [; ]  [0; 1]. The density is given by M > n + 2; i.e. in each country
there is less potential producers than consumers. When the quality of the goods
is perfectly observable, the indirect utility of purchasing one unit of good x is
conditional on consumers type  and can be formalized as
U(p; ) = [R + (  )a  p(a)] (2)
where R denotes the reservation value, which represents common willingness to
pay for the goods basic physical characteristics with any given quality. Parameter
 > 1 expresses the common component in consumers preferences for environ-
mental quality.12 In a full information environment parameter a denotes the envi-
ronmental attribute of the good determined by the sellers abatement technology,
and p(a) is the price of the good. Thus, (   )a determines consumer-specic
marginal willingness to pay for the goods environmental quality.
The environmental quality is considered a credence attribute, which cannot be
observed even after the purchase.13 Consumers have, however, a prior idea about
the initial distribution of qualities in the market and observe the cost-structure
described in assumption (2). This gives a raise to a signaling game in which the
rms can use prices to a¤ect the consumersbeliefs about their environmental
quality.
The signaling game has two stages. The consumers enter the market with a prior
distribution of qualities in their minds. The rms set prices and the consumers
update their beliefs about the goods environmental qualities on the basis of
12The role of parameter  is treated in more detail in assumption 5.
13This is a plausible assumption, especially in the case of internationally traded goods with long
geographical distance between production and consumption locations. Firms cannot build reputations,
as the quality is unobservable. For more information on reputation-building and product quality, see
Shapiro (1982). For more information on credence attributes and signaling through labeling see Auriol
and Schilizzi (2003).
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their information on the cost-structure.14 When a price-signal p(a) is perceived
credible by the consumer , her utility of the purchase coincides with (2), i.e. U =
U [p(a); ]. However, in a market with di¤erent qualities and no credible price-
signal linking the qualities and goods, the consumer-specic marginal willingness
to pay for the goods environmental quality is the same for any good in the
market. Hence, the indirect utility in a pooling equilibrium can be described by
the following von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function
U e[p(c); )] = [R + (  )c   p(c)];
where c =
NP
i=1
ai
N
and N denotes the number of active rms.15 This indicates
that the perceived environmental quality in a pooling equilibrium is determined
by the average quality in the market. From the specication of the utility function
it follows immediately that although the consumers willingness to pay increases
when a producer chooses to increase his quality, only the goods with the lowest
price survive in the market. Hence, the market for high qualities will collapse,
unless the producers can credibly signal their qualities through labeling or price-
signaling.
4. Market coverage: The preferences and the cost function satisfy the following
properties:
C(a)  R and C 0(a)  (  ); (3)
Expression (3) states that if goods are priced at marginal cost, then all consumers
buy the highest quality.16 Furthermore, when the lowest quality in the market is
priced at C(a), all consumers buy a good regardless of the quality-distribution.
5. Quality decision and asymmetric information: The quality game between
the rms is sequential: Nature the incumbent that gets to choose its quality
rst. After the incumbentsquality decision, the entrants choose quality levels.17
14A more detailed description of the consumersbelief system is in subsection 2.1.
15See also Jansen and Lincé de Faria (2002).
16This assumption ensures that so-called niteness property holds, hence, the market is a natural
oligopoly under full information. See Anderson et al. (1992).
17For a similar treatment of rmsentry decisions in a vertically di¤erentiated oligopoly, see e.g.
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The quality levels are observable, but non-veriable. Specically, the existing
qualities are observed by each agent, but they cannot be linked to a particular
rm.18
6. Labeling and mutual recognition: Under third-party labeling, an indepen-
dent intermediary monitors rmsperformance and grants a label for a rm that
meets the given labeling requirement. Consumers perceive the label as a credible
signal of the goodsenvironmental quality. Mutual-recognition of labels implies
that when the market consists of multiple labels, consumers observe the existing
quality-requirements, but without further information they cannot ascertain the
potential di¤erences between environmental qualities indicated by the labels.
7. The structure of the full game: The structure of the game is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. First, the rms choose qualities as described above. This involves a decision
about participation to the national labeling program and, by entrantsquality
decisions, the number of active rms at the production stage of the game.19 Sec-
ond, the consumers and the rms form their prior beliefs about qualities in the
market. Third, the rms set prices, on the basis which the consumers update
their beliefs. Firms can set a single price within each country, but can use price
Peitz (2002).
18For instance, when rm 2 is the rst-mover and incumbent 1 is the follower, rm 1 observes
that quality distribution on the market is 1(a2) = a2: After the quality decision of rm 1, the rst
entrant N observes the existing qualities and based on a2 and a1, its assessment of overall quality on
the market is N (a2; a1) = (a2 + a1)=2.
19That is, each entrant that chooses a quality aN > 0 is considered an active rm.
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discrimination across markets.
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choice and entry
Firms:
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export market
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domestic market
Consumers:
Posterior assessment
of qualities
Consumers:
Posterior assessment
of qualities
Stage 1 Stage 3Stage 2
SignalingQuality
Figure 1: Timing of the game
3 Pareto-E¢ ciency and Full-Information Benchmark
This section characterizes market behavior under full information and imperfect compe-
tition, and derives the circumstances under which the market exhibits a Pareto-e¢ cient
quality allocation. We use Pareto e¢ ciency as a benchmark to illustrate the welfare
loss associated with the market imperfections. Full information benchmark comes in
useful as a starting point for the analysis of the quality competition under asymmetric
information and welfare comparisons under di¤erent labeling schemes.
Letting p(a) denote the market price of the good with quality a, a necessary re-
quirement for Pareto-e¢ ciency is given by
p(a)  p(a)  (  )(a  a) for all  2 [; ] and a 2 [a; a]: (4)
Pareto-e¢ ciency thus requires that quality a is produced and each consumer buys this
quality at a price that yields her a nonnegative surplus in comparison to competing
varieties in the market. For future reference it is worth noting that this allocation
obtains when p(a) = C(a):
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3.1 Full-Information Benchmark
Suppose that the market consists of rms 1 and 2.20 The rms produce goods x1
and x2 with environmental qualities a1 and a2; respectively. We assume that the
qualities satisfy a1 < a2. For the ease of exposition we assume that in full-information
equilibrium, the market is fully covered.
Denote the customer who is indi¤erent between buying x1 and x2 at prices p1 and
p2; as b: Since the ranking of preferences is inverse, each consumer with  < ^ buys
the higher quality, and consumers  > ^ buy the lower quality. The demand for x2
and x1 can thus be formalized as D2 = Mb and D1 = M(1   b); respectively. Using
consumersutility function we obtain b =    (p2   p1)=(a2   a1); hence, the prots
can be written as
2(p2; p1l ) =M
b[p2   C(a2)]  2(a2);
1(p2; p1) =M(1  b)[p1   C(a1)]  1(a1);
where 2(a2) = ; and 1(a1) =  for a1 > a and 1(a) = 0. The rms choose prices
taking the quality decisions and the associated sunk costs as given. The rst-order
conditions yield the following equilibrium price levels:
p^2 = 1=3[(+ 1)(a2   a1) + 2C(a2) + C(a1)] (5)
p^1 = 1=3[(2  )(a2   a1) + 2C(a1) + C(a2)]: (6)
It is easy to verify that (5) and (6) express the equilibrium prices.21 Hence, we infer
that
Lemma 1 In a full-information equilibrium, qualities are such that a  a1 < a2  a
and b < : The quality distribution in the market falls short of the Pareto-e¢ cient
allocation
Proof. The rst part of the proof is by contradiction. Assume a < a1 = a2  a;
20Although the model allows for entry, we assume only two rms. This is for expositional purposes
to illustrate the perfect information benchmark. A condition which determines the upper bound for
active rms can be found in Cremer and Thisse (1999).
21For a similar analysis of the price game, see e.g. Cremer and Thisse (1999).
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by Bertrand argument the long-term prot is i =   < 0; i = 1; 2. Hence, the
equilibrium is strictly dominated by any quality distribution that involves a  a1 <
a2  a. Assume then that a = a1 = a2. (1) together with (5) and (6) imply that
for given a = a1; an increase in a2 yields a positive mark-up for each rm. Quality
distribution a = a1 = a2, in turn entails i = 0; i = 1; 2; hence, this distribution is
strictly dominated by a  a1 < a2  a.
The proof of the second part is a straightforward consequence of (4) and the rst-
part of Lemma 1. Since both rms are active in equilibrium, at least one consumer buys
the good with quality a1 < a. Hence, the equilibrium does not satisfy the requirement
for Pareto-e¢ ciency (4).
This result establishes that both incumbent rms are active and produce di¤er-
entiated goods with prices strictly above their marginal cost. The quality di¤erence
depends on the parameters of the model, therefore, little can be said about the relation
between quality extremes and equilibrium qualities. However, Lemma 1 unambigu-
ously establishes the quality allocation is not welfare-optimal. The reason is that the
rm producing higher quality can price-discriminate consumers with a lower willingness
contributing to a ine¢ cient market outcome as some consumers do not buy quality a.22
4 Asymmetric-Information Benchmark in Autarky
When environmental quality of the goods is a credence attribute, the consumers know
the distribution of qualities in the market, but the quality-di¤erences cannot be veried
without further information.23 This gives raise to the signaling game which is the focus
of the analysis in this section. For the reasons of tractability we consider rst the case
of single a market. The results will then be used as a stepping stone in the analysis of
third-party labeling and international trade.
22This result coincides with previous studies on vertical product di¤erentiation. For example, Cram-
pes and Hollander (1995) show that although high-quality producer could capture the entire market,
it is more protable to allow lower qualities exist on the market.
23This is arguably a rather extreme assumption, but it is widely used in models of oligopoly signaling.
See e.g. Herzendorf and Overgaard (2000); Herzendorf and Overgaard (2001); and Fluet and Garella
(2002).
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4.1 Consumer Beliefs and Demand
Suppose that the market consist of two active rms.24 The rms rst set prices and
consumers then draw inferences about the actual qualities of goods in the market. The
equilibrium of the signaling game is thus a pair of prices and a system of posterior
beliefs about product qualities. The solution mechanism of the game is the following.
Starting from the last stage, we determine the set of price-pairs that implement a
belief system consistent with the denition of the separating equilibrium. This involves
the analysis of the evolution of consumersbelief system and corresponding demand
functions. Given the consumersbelief system, the second step is to investigate rms
signaling strategies, which determines the equilibrium outcome of the signaling game
for any given quality distribution. Finally, we examine the rmsquality and entry
decisions.
Let p = (p1; p2; a1; a2) and s = (p1; p2; a1; a2) denote the beliefs when qualities
are veriable and unveriable by consumers, respectively. Furthermore, given prices p1
and p2; let 1(p1; p2) denote the consumers assessment that rm 1s quality is a2. This
belief system satises 1(p1; p2) = 1   2(p1; p2); where 2(p1; p2) is the consumers
assessment that rm 2s quality is a2:25
Consumers know the cost functions of the rms and a rational consumer infers
that the price of a variety a2 must yield a non-negative mark-up for the producer, i.e.
p2  C(a2). Hence, the belief system exhibits the following properties.
Lemma 2 Suppose that a2 > a1: Given qualities (a1; a2); prices (p1; p2) and costs
[C(a1); C(a2)]; system (p1; p2; a1; a2) is such that
(i)  = p, i.e. 1(p1; p2) = 1=2 iff p1; p2 2 [C(a2); p];
(ii)  = s, i.e. 1(p1; p2) = 0 iff p1 2 [C(a1); C(a2)); where p = R + a2.
Proof. Lemma 2 requires that all observed prices must be admissible. Hence,
(i) For prices p1; p2 2 [C(a2); p], where p = R+a2 is the choke-o¤price, consumers
infer that any rm charging p  C(a2) could be selling quality a2: Hence, a consumer
expects that any good in the market is of the higher quality with probability 1=2:
24It will be shown that in equilibrium only two rms are active.
25Since the market consists of two product varieties, the beliefs are such that 1(p1; p2)+2(p1; p2) =
1:
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(ii) Admissibility ensures that no rm will set prices below their marginal-cost.
Thus, if a price p1 < C(a2) is observed, it implies that the quality of the good is a1;
and consumers update their beliefs accordingly.
Lemma 2 establishes that the consumersbeliefs are determined through the low-
quality rms pricing decision. Consequently, implementation of separating beliefs
requires that rm 1 has an incentive reveal its true type. Otherwise, no separating
equilibrium exists.26
Using Lemma 2, the demand system, D  ( bD2; bD1); can be written as
D 
8>>><>>>:
(Mb;M(1  b)) for  = s
(M=2;M=2) for  = p : p1 = p2 < R + (  1)c(a1; a2)
(0;M) for  = p : p1 < p2  R + (  1)c(a1; a2)
where c(a1; a2) = (a1 + a2)=2 denotes the expected quality in the market. The
system is derived using the consumersassessments about qualities and responses to
the observed price-di¤erential. First, when consumers observe the actual qualities, the
demand system coincides with the one under full information. Second, in a pooling
equilibrium, the rms split the market with equal prices. Finally, when the consumer
cannot link the rms and qualities, a rm with lower price captures the entire market,
because consumers are willing to pay a single price for any good in the market.
4.2 Price Signaling
Having analyzed how consumers update their beliefs after realizing the prices in the
market, we move on to the analysis of rmspricing strategies. The analysis is in three
steps. First, we show that full-information prices do not constitute an equilibrium
under asymmetric information. Then we investigate the existence of price-pairs, which
constitute separating equilibria. Finally, after the determination of the set of potential
equilibrium price-pairs, we solve for an equilibrium that cannot be destabilized by
one-stage deviations.
26It is important to note that Lemma 2 describes the basic belief system, which abstracts from
renements that rely on out-of-equilibrium prices. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs will be treated in more
detail below.
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Consider rm 1s price decision when it conjectures that rm 2 has set its price equal
to full-information level. Lemma 2 establishes that a separating equilibrium requires
the rm with lower quality to reveal its type. In Appendix A we show that given the
full-information price level p^2, rm 1s optimal price-response is
p1 = p^2 for p^2  R + (  1)c(a1; a2)
p1  p^2 for p^2 > R + (  1)c(a1; a2);
(7)
where p^1 and p^2 denote full-information price levels. Hence, full-information prices do
not constitute an equilibrium under asymmetric information. This is because rm 1
observes that for given p^2; it can split the entire market for the goods by imitating rm
2. If p^2 is high enough, so that pooling induces partial market-coverage, rm 1 captures
the entire market and increases its prot by setting p1 = R+( 1)c(a1; a2), i.e. just
the price for which it captures the entire market for the expected quality c(a1; a2).
In order to determine whether there is a price pair that constitutes a separating
equilibrium, we need to consider rm 1s best-response to all admissible prices p2 2
[C(a2); R + ]. To this end, consider rm 1s best-response correspondence, p1(p2). A
price p2 that implements a separating equilibrium is such that rm 1 rather reveals
its type by setting p1 < C(a2) than imitates rm 2. In Appendix A we show that the
best-response of rm 1 is always (weakly) higher than the marginal cost of the rm
with higher quality:
Proposition 1 Regardless of the di¤erences between the rmsenvironmental quality,
the rm producing higher environmental quality cannot induce the low-quality rm to
reveal its actual quality to consumers. Hence, no separating equilibria exist.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This proposition states that rm 2 cannot implement a separating equilibrium. The
reason is that for p2 > C(a2); by setting p1 = p2  "; rm 1 captures the entire market
for expected quality c(a1; a2)  a1. For p2 = C(a2); rm 1; in turn, imitates rm 2
and charges p1 = C(a2) rather than reveals its type.
We have now determined the set of potential equilibria in the signaling game. To
establish the strategically stable equilibrium, however, requires a brief look at how
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the consumers update their beliefs on the basis of observed out-of-equilibrium prices.
Consider a candidate equilibrium: ~p1 = ~p2 > C(a2): The strict inequality implies that
each rm can increase its prot by slightly cutting the price-level. A price-cut could
be inferred as a defection by the low quality rm, but the consumer has no reason to
rule out the possibility that the lower price is set by the one with quality a2. Hence,
when consumer observes prices p1 < p2; she updates her beliefs to 1() = 0; if and
only if p1 < C(a2).27 This result gives raise to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Equilibrium prices equal the marginal cost of the high-quality rm
C(a2). Although rm 2 makes zero short-term prot, it will not be driven out of the
market. Firm 1s mark-up equals the di¤erence between the rmsmarginal costs, i.e.
1h(a
1; a2) = (M=2)[C(a2)  C(a1)] > 0
2h(a
1; a2) = (M=2)[C(a2)  C(a2)] = 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The result can be understood intuitively as follows. A candidate pooling equilibrium-
candidate with a prior belief-system c(a2; a1) > a1 and prices p1 = p2 > C(a2), does
not constitute an equilibrium. This is because the equilibrium is destabilized by a
price-cut on behalf any of the two rms, insofar as consumersbeliefs about product
quality are una¤ected by such defection. For p1 = p2 = C(a2); a price-cut results in
an update of consumer beliefs, so that a rm with price p0 < C(a2) is producing lower
quality with certainty.
Although the equilibrium outcome is driven by Bertrand-type argument, the char-
acterization of the equilibrium is quite di¤erent. From the consumersviewpoint, each
good in the market has the same expected quality and the evolution of the belief system
allows the rms to cut prices similarly as in a standard Bertrand game. However, as
opposed to the Bertrand-outcome with heterogeneous costs, in equilibrium both rms
are active since no rm can feasibly set its price below C(a2): This is because by setting
27It is important to note that we abstract from equilibrium renements that are consistent with
another equilibrium. Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993) argue that no defection should
be considered in isolation. Their idea is that an equilibrium can be destabilized only by another
equilibrium, not by an isolated defection.
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p1 < C(a2), the rm 1 would induce a shift in consumer beliefs, which by condition (3)
results in zero demand for its product.
4.3 Quality Game
The quality subgame is a sequential decision process in three stages.28 First, the
incumbent 2 chooses its quality. Second, incumbent 1 observes that market consists of
quality a2 and chooses a1. Finally, the entrants observe the quality distribution in the
market and choose to enter or remain passive.
The incumbents anticipate the potential entrants quality decisions and observe
that the price-premium generated by choosing higher abatement level will be fully
appropriated by one of the rivals. This implies negative payo¤ in the long-term, and
thus, the optimal strategy for each incumbent is quality a:
Proposition 3 Under asymmetric information without labeling, the market consist of
two incumbent rms producing at the minimum quality level, a:
Proof. Consider the incumbent 2s quality decision. Letting aN(a2; a1) denote
the entrantsquality decision given the incumbentsqualities, the incumbent rm 2s
program is given by
max
a2
2[a2; a1; aN(a2; a1)] = (M=n)[p2(a2; a1; aN)  C(ai)]  2(a2);
s:t:
p2(a2; a1; aN) = C(a2) for a2  a
where aN(a2; a1) is the entrants best response function to incumbentsquality decisions
and  = n+ 2 for aN(a2; a1)  a; and  = 2 for aN(a2; a1) = a. It is su¢ cient to show
that rm 2 always chooses a2 = a; for this induces a1 = a and aN(a2; a1) = a: Suppose
rm 2 chooses a2 > a: By Proposition 2, this implies that the rm 1 with lower quality
can capture positive rent by choosing a1 = a: This yields a negative long-term prot
for rm 2. Hence, an optimal strategy for rm 2 involves a2 = a, which implements
a1 = a and aN(a1; a2) = a.
28For a similar treatment of rmsquality decision under threat of entry, see e.g. Peitz (2002).
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A rm that chooses to abate more than the minimal requirement a, raises the
overall quality and the price level in the market. This generates an information rent
for the rms producing lower quality. Anticipating this, the rms have diminished
incentives to improve their quality for it yields a negative long-term prot. Hence,
only the incumbent rms can feasibly produce for the market, but the quality level will
be ine¢ ciently low.29 This result is typical in models with asymmetric information, like
those in Akerlof (1970) and Leland (1979). However, unlike these papers, the present
model allows for endogenous quality choice. The welfare implication of the result is
nevertheless that provision of quality is minimal and therefore lower than under full
information with two active rms.
5 Third-Party Labeling and Trade
This section examines the inuence of third-party labeling-programs in the domestic
and export markets. Since we assume that the rms set a single price within each mar-
ket, but can price discriminate between markets, it is convenient to analyze the market
outcomes separately. In what follows, the rst subsection introduces national labeling
requirements and examines rmsquality decisions in autarky. The second subsection
examines the industry equilibrium in the export market under mutual recognition of
labels. Finally, we analyze whether the equilibrium properties in the export-market
inuence the domestic market, and compare the welfare implications under di¤erent
presumptions about the labeling requirements.
5.1 Labeling in Autarky
Suppose that a domestic labeling intermediary imposes a requirement ad : a  ad > a,
which the local rms must meet to be eligible for quality-certication, Ld. Consumers
observe that any rm i with a label Ld is producing with quality ai  ad. The label Ld
indicates thus that the good meets the standard ad, but if the market consists of two
labeled goods with qualities aj > ai  ad; the label does not provide ranking between
29It is worth noting that raising the minimum quality standard would imply negative long-term
prot as the competition would drive the price premium to zero for each active rm.
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the goods in terms of their quality. Hence, the problem of asymmetric information is
present in each sub-market with more than one product variety.
A feasible standard ad must satisfy the following participation constraint for rm
2:
2[a1(a2); a2; aN(a1; a2)]  0 for a2  ad; (8)
where aN(a1; a2) = [a3(a1; a2); a4(); :::; an()] denotes the quality response of the en-
trants and a1(a2) that of the incumbent 1. The constraint simply states that a successful
program yields a non-negative long-term prot.
Consider then the rmsquality decisions under a given standard ad. Starting from
the last stage of the quality game, the entrant takes the existing qualities in the market
as given and chooses whether to enter the market. The optimal quality choice is the
following:
aN(a1; a2)
8>>><>>>:
= ad for a
i > ad and a
j = a
= a for ai = ad and a
j > a
= 0 for ai = ad and a
j = a;
where i; j = 1; 2 denote the existing qualities in the market and aN = 0 refers to the case
of no entry. The characterization of this quality decision implies that entrant N chooses
to enter, when it observes quality levels higher than ad or a. The decision is driven
by the observed information rent in each sub-market which can be fully appropriated
by an entrant that has a lower quality-level than the incumbent rm. However, when
incumbents choose qualities ad and a, entry yields negative long-term prot for the
entrant. As a result, such initial quality distribution discourages entry and leads to a
duopoly outcome in the market.
Firm 1 anticipates the entrants response to incumbentsquality-decisions. Hence,
given incumbent 2s quality level ad or a, rm 1s quality-response becomes
a1(a2)
8<: = ad for a2 = a= a for a2 = ad:
The reason why rm 1s choice is a binary one between ad and a, is that for any other
quality level, either rm 2 or the entrants appropriate the information rent associated
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with increase in rm 1s quality.
Given the followersresponses, a similar reasoning applies for rm 2 and its decision
boils down to choosing between quality levels ad and a: Thus, when requirement is such
that
2(a2; a1) = 2[p^2(ad); p^
1(a)] > 2[p^2(a); p^1(ad)]; (9)
where p^2() and p^1() denote the full information prices, rm 2 chooses a2 = ad. If the
inequality is reversed, rm 2 chooses a2 = a and rm 1s response is a1 = ad: In both
cases, entry is deterred by the incumbents, because the entrants observe that entry
with a higher quality level leads to a signaling game which yields negative long-term
prot.
The analysis implies that the equilibrium in autarky involves two active rms with
qualities ad and a. Hence, resulting equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
Lemma 3 In autarky, a labeling program implements an equilibrium that coincides
with the full information equilibrium with qualities a1 = a and a2 = ad. Regardless
of the standard ad; the market equilibrium does not satisfy the criteria for Pareto-
e¢ ciency.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the analysis and the proof of Proposi-
tion 3. Lemma 1 ensures that the outcome is not welfare optimal.
Lemma 3 implies that only qualities ad and a survive the competition in the domes-
tic market and entry is not protable. Since only the incumbent rms are active, the
price competition is less intense and the high-quality producer can price discriminate
the consumers with lower willingness to pay. This means that the equilibrium does not
satisfy the criteria for Pareto e¢ ciency as there is segment of consumers not buying
the high quality good.
5.2 Equilibrium Pricing in the Export-Market
The importing country has no domestic production of x and it has not designed a label
for the imported goods. Under mutual recognition of labels, the consumers observe that
the labeled sub-market involves two qualities, ad and af , but the di¤erence between
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the qualities indicated by the labels cannot be veried. The consumers prior belief
about the quality of a good with a label is therefore c(ad; af ) > ad, when ad < af .
When the labels are harmonized, there is a full information in the labeled sub-market,
i.e. c(ad; af ) = ad.
Since the consumers cannot observe the quality di¤erence, the equilibrium in the
export market has the following properties:
Lemma 4 Suppose that each producing country has a labeling program that allows
rms with quality ad (af ) carry a label Ld (Lf ). IN equilibrium:
(i) Under harmonized requirements, (i.e. af = ad), only labeled goods are exported
and sold at marginal cost.
(ii) Under mutual recognition of country-specic labels with qualities af > ad > a;
there is a pooling equilibrium in the export market. The consumersbeliefs about the
quality of the labeled goods are given by c(af ; ad) > ad and prices equal the marginal
cost of the rm with higher quality, i.e. p2d = p
2
f = C(af ). Each rm with a label
survives in the export market.
(iii) When the quality di¤erence is small, each consumer rather buys a labeled good
than an unlabeled one. Hence, the unlabeled goods will be driven out of the export
market if
(  )[c(af ; ad)  a]  C(af ) for af   ad > ; (10)
where  is a critical parameter that determines the quality di¤erence under which the
consumers are just indi¤erent between buying a good with expected quality c(af ; ad)
and a good with a certain quality a for a marginal cost prices C(a) and C(af ).
Proof. Result (i) follows immediately from Bertrand argument and condition (1).
Part (ii) is a direct consequence of Lemma 3: When ad < af the labeled rms from
country d prefer to pool rather than set their prices below C(af ), indicating that the
optimal pricing strategy for the rms with a label Ld is p2d = p
2
f = C(af ). Part (iii)
follows directly from a consumerspayo¤ comparison: Under marginal cost pricing, the
expected quality of a labeled good c(af ; ad) yields a higher surplus than the unlabeled
variety, insofar as the quality di¤erence is small enough. For instance, when ad ! af ,
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no consumer is willing to purchase an unlabeled good, and the market for a does not
exist.
The rst part of the result is straightforward. In equilibrium, rms with identical
costs and qualities end up setting marginal-cost prices. By condition (3) this drives
the unlabeled variety out of the market, thus all active rms have zero prot in the
export market. The second part argues that the labeled sub-market exhibits pooling.
The reasoning is similar to that of Proposition 2: For any given price p2f ; a labeled rm
of country d will not reveal its true type, and consequently, the labeled producer set
their prices equal to marginal cost of the high-quality producer. These prices are just
high enough to keep all labeled rms active in the export market and sustain pooling
beliefs.
The third part argues that the quality distribution in the export market depends
on the steepness of the consumersutility function and that of the cost function. When
the consumers have strong preferences for environmental quality, they rather buy any
good with a label than a good without one. This property holds locally when the
quality-di¤erence is small, i.e. c(af ; ad) ! af ; and globally when ad ! a, provided
that the cost function is su¢ ciently at.
Figure 3a describes a polar case which illustrates the third part of Lemma 4. In
this case the cost function is relatively at and ad ! a. Consumer  observes that the
expected quality of labeled goods is lower than the highest quality available, but for a
price equal to C(af ); she rather buys a labeled good than an unlabeled one, the low-
quality rms split the unlabeled sub-market and make zero prot.30 This is illustrated
in Figure 3b, where consumers  =  purchase the unlabeled variety.
30In Figures 3a and 3b, CS[c(af ; ad)] denotes the di¤erence between consumer surplus when
buying labeled goods instead of unlabeled ones for marginal cost prices, C(af ) and C(a); respectively.
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Figure 3a:
(  )[c(af ; ad)  a] > C(af )
Figure 3b:
(  )[c(af ; ad)  a] < C(af )
5.3 Welfare Analysis
This section derives the links between the outcomes in the di¤erent markets of the
model. In particular, we examine whether the information rent in the export market is
su¢ ciently high to induce entry in the producing countries, and thereby inuence the
quality distribution and pricing in the markets of the producing countries.
The entry decision is driven by two e¤ects. First, Lemma 3 implies that in au-
tarky, entry induces zero short-term prot in the domestic market, regardless of the
labeling requirements of the foreign country. Second, a di¤erence between the labeling
requirements generates a rent in the export market. When this rent is high enough,
it outweighs the xed cost of entry, and therefore, increases the number of labeled
producers. The market implications of these e¤ects are described in more detail in the
following lemma:
Lemma 5 Suppose that (10) holds. If af > ad the industry-equilibrium is such that
(i) Each domestic rm chooses quality ad and makes positive prots in the export
market:
2d(ad; af ) = [M=(n+ 3)][C(af )  C(ad)] > 0:
Marginal-cost pricing implies zero-prot for the foreign rm.
(ii) Domestic market consists of n+2 labeled rms producing quality ad, and charg-
ing prices equal to C(ad).
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Under harmonized labeling requirements af = ad; the market outcome in the pro-
ducing countries coincides with the full information benchmark with qualities a and ad.
Only labeled rms produce for the export market, in which prices equal marginal cost.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 5 establishes that a di¤erence between labeling requirements increases the
number of rms with label Ld. In domestic market this induces tougher competition,
and consequently, increases the market share of the labeled variety. Under harmonized
labeling requirements, rmsprots in the export market are zero. Since the incumbent
can deter entry in the domestic country, the lack of competition in the producing
countries implies that the quality distribution coincides with the one under autarky.
The following result illustrates the welfare implications of this pro-competitive e¤ect
of mutual recognition of national eco-labels.
Proposition 4 For any given af , a labeling schedule with requirement ad = af   ";
where " ! 0; is welfare-superior to harmonized labels, ad = af . In particular, when
af = a, the property ad = a   " implements a Pareto-e¢ cient allocation of quality in
country d and export market.
Under harmonized standards the export market exhibits marginal-cost pricing, but
in each producing country there is only one labeled producer which can employ its
market power to gain positive mark-up for its product and price-discriminate consumers
with lower willingness to pay. This is because entry is unprotable and the lack of
competition in labeled sub-market implies that the outcome does not satisfy the criteria
for Pareto-e¢ ciency.
Proposition 4 states that there is a positive spillover associated with mutual recog-
nition which can correct for ine¢ ciently low provision of quality in domestic market. To
further emphasize this e¤ect, suppose that af = a: A small di¤erence between the la-
beling requirements changes the industry-structure through the information rent in the
export-market, generating an incentive for new producers to apply for domestic label.
An increase in the number labeled rms intensies the price-competition in domestic
market, and consequently, drives the prices down toward marginal-costs. Lower prices
allow all domestic consumers to purchase the labeled variety and unlabeled goods will
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be driven out of the market. It then follows that when labeling requirement of the
foreign country is a and the di¤erence between requirements is small, the outcome in
the domestic market satises the criteria for Pareto-e¢ ciency.
While this result provides a stylized argument for mutual recognition of labels, it
should be noted that Pareto-e¢ cient outcome in all markets is unfeasible. This is
because it requires that only quality a is produced and purchased by each individual in
all countries. Based in the above considerations this cannot be implemented through
labeling or by imposing minimum quality standards.
6 Conclusion
This paper examined the structure of an international vertically di¤erentiated industry,
and the welfare implications of harmonization and mutual recognition of national eco-
labels. The analysis shows that a di¤erence between labeling requirements induces a
positive spillover in a country which applies lower standards to its producers. The
e¤ect is generated through an information rent in the export-market which increases
the number of labeled producers, and thereby improves the aggregate environmental
quality of goods.
More specically, the paper showed rst that under full information, the overall
quality in the market falls short of Pareto-e¢ ciency. Second, asymmetric information
drives all goods produced with higher abatement level out of the market, and conse-
quently, only goods with minimal environmental quality will be produced. The problem
of asymmetric information can be mitigated by establishing a third-party labeling pro-
gram. In autarky, the program improves quality provision, but yet the allocation of
environmental quality is ine¢ cient. This is because incumbent rms can deter entry in
the labeled sub-market and then price-discriminate consumers with a lower willingness
to pay for the goodsenvironmental quality.
Mutual recognition of labels with di¤erent labeling standards generates an infor-
mation rent in the export market for the rms with lower standards. The rent also
yields positive prot for the entrants and thereby intensies price-competition in do-
mestic market as the number of the labeled rms increases. In other words, a small
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imperfection in the form of lower market transparency in the export market intensies
competition, and makes the high quality goods more a¤ordable to consumers in the
producing countries. This increases the consumerssurplus and diminishes the produc-
tion related environmental externalities. Under harmonized labeling requirements the
incumbent rms can deter entry, which diminishes the share of high quality products
in domestic market. A welfare comparison between mutual recognition and harmo-
nization thus reveals that under mutual recognition a small di¤erence between labeling
standards Pareto-dominates the full information outcome with harmonized labels.
Appendix A
Proof of (7). The proof consists of two cases: (a) fully covered markets p^2 <
R + (   1)c(a1; a2) and (b) partial market-coverage p^2 > R + (   1)c(a1; a2).
Uncovered market refers to the case in which the full information price p^2 is high
enough so that when both rms set their price equal to p^2 then some consumers do not
buy the good.
(a) Full market coverage implies that when rm 1 sets p1 = p^2 each consumer buys
the good and rms split the demand. The condition 1[p1; p^2;p]  1(p^1; p^2;s) thus
becomes
1
2

p^2   C(a1)  1  + (p^2   p1l )
(a2   a1)

[p^1   C(a1)]:
By substituting the closed form expression for p^2 the condition can be rewritten as
(+ 1)(a2   a1) + 2C(a2)  2(1  ^) (  1)(a2   a1) + C(a1) + C(a2) :
Since  + 1 > 2(1   ^)(   1) and 2C(a2) > C(a1) + C(a2), we conclude that full
information prices do not constitute an equilibrium.
(b) Partial market coverage implies that some consumers refuse to buy the good at
price p^2. However, for any price below the critical level each consumer would buy the
good with expected quality c(a1; a2). Hence, it is su¢ cient to show that by setting
p1 = R+(  1)c(a1; a2); rm 1s payo¤ is higher than under full information prices,
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and thereby the condition can be written as
R + (  1)c(a1; a2)  C(a1) > (1  ^)[p^1   C(a1)]:
The properties 1  ^ < 1 and R + (   1)c(a1; a2) > p^1 readily show that pooling is
indeed optimal for rm 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. To show that rm 2 cannot induce rm 1 to reveal
its true type we must prove that under no circumstances rm 1 sets its price below
C(a2). Existence of separating equilibrium thus requires that there is p2 that induces
a response p1 < C(a2): Formally, this requires
~p1 = argmax
p1
1(p1; p2; s) (11)
1(~p1; p2;s)  1(p2; p2;p) : ~p1 < C(a2) (12)
Expression (11) states that ~p1 must be a prot maximizer for rm 1 given beliefs s;
(12) sates that in an equilibrium, rm 1 has no incentives to pool:
In the proof of (7) we showed that for p2 > C(a2) rm 1 can capture the entire
market by setting p1 = p2   ": Plugging this into (12) and evaluating at " ! 0; the
condition becomes:
(1  ^)[p1   C(a1)]  p2   C(a1) :
This is obviously a contradiction since (1   ^) < 1. For p2 = C(a2), condition (3)
implies that rm 1 reveals its type i¤
0  1
2

C(a2)  C(a1) :
This is a contradiction. Hence, no separating equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof follows the same lines of reasoning as the
proof of Proposition 1. Consider an equilibrium candidate (~p1; ~p2) : ~p1 = ~p2 > C(a2).
By Bertrand-argument we infer that each rm can destabilize the equilibrium by setting
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its price marginally lower than that of the rival: e.g. p1 = ~p2 " and capture the entire
market.
Price-cutting is (weakly) benecial for both rms insofar as the strategy proles
satisfy ~p2 " = C(a2). Letting "! 0; the equilibrium price-pair thus becomes (~p1; ~p2) =
[C(a2); C(a2)] with payo¤s 1(a1; a2) = (M=2) [C(a2)  C(a1)] > 0 and 2(a1; a2) =
(M=2) [C(a2)  C(a2)] = 0.
This equilibrium is strategically stable for the following reasons: (a) Since the rm
with lower price captures the entire market, neither rm can increase its payo¤ by
upward price-deviation. (b) Price-cutting implies negative prot for rm 2. In terms
of price-cost margin per unit of output, rm 1 would make positive prot by cutting
its price. However, since rm 1s conjectures that the rival will keep its price xed
p2 = C(a2); it also infers that when beliefs are updated according to the observed
signal p1 < C(a2), each consumer would buy the good with quality a2 implying zero
demand.
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 5. The rst part states that (a) all domestic rms produce with
quality ad and (b) the foreign rm is active in the export market.
(a) Lemma 4 readily shows that export market exhibits pooling and the cost advan-
tage for domestic rms is C(af ) C(ad) per unit of output. For the domestic entrants
this implies positive payo¤ from entry. Hence, each entrant enters with quality ad.
Condition (3) and a standard Bertrand argument ensures that domestic market with
multiple rms with quality ad induces marginal cost pricing in the labeled sub-market
and thus zero demand for the unlabeled variety. Thus, all domestic rms choose quality
ad.
(b) Follows immediately from that foreign country has positive mark-up in the local
market which provides an incentive to participate the labeling program.
The second part argues that under identical labeling requirements, domestic mar-
ket equilibrium coincides with the full information outcome with qualities ad and
a: Bertrand argument ensures that market outcome in the export market involves
108
marginal-cost pricing, and consequently, zero prot for all labeled rms. Thus, Lemma
4 ensures that entry yields negative prot in both in domestic and in the export market,
indicating that the market in the producing countries involves only 2 rms producing
qualities a and ad:
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